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Abstract

Precipitated by the legislative decision to decouple child Medicaid benefits from welfare
receipt, the number of young children qualifying for public health insurance grew markedly
throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. From a baseline of roughly 15% in the average state at the
beginning of the decade, the rate increased to more than 40% of all young children in the United
States by the time all federal mandates were fully enacted in 1992. This paper extends the
academic literature examining early childhood investments and longer-term human capital
measures by exploring whether public health insurance expansions to low-income children led to
a greater number of high school completers in the 2000s. Building on the literature that uses the
generosity of a state’s Medicaid program as a time-varying, exogenous source of variation in a
quasi-experimental design, I find a positive and statistically significant relationship between
Medicaid eligibility during early childhood – defined as conception through age 5 – and longerterm high school completion rates. Completion is examined in two forms: the dropout rate and
the traditional four-year high school graduation rate. Intent-to-treat estimates range from a 1.9 to
2.5 percentage point (pp) decrease in the dropout rate for each 10 pp increase in early childhood
years covered by the state-level Medicaid program. The same 10 pp increase in child Medicaid
program generosity reveals increases of 1.0 to 1.3 pp when applied to graduation rates, indicating
that completion gains are propelled by increases in traditional diplomas. Furthermore, results
appear to be driven by Hispanics and white students, the two groups which experienced the
greatest within-group eligibility increases due to the decoupling of child Medicaid from the Aid
to Families with Dependent Children program.

JEL Codes: C23; H51; H52; H75; I21
Keywords: Child Medicaid Expansions; High School Completion; Early Childhood Investments

1.

Introduction
Before the 1980s, qualification for public health insurance under state-level Medicaid

programs was traditionally tied to the receipt of Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) benefits, although states could voluntarily choose to cover other low-income groups,
such as the medically needy or single women pregnant for the first time. As the battle between
conservatives and liberals over the direction of social welfare policy and government spending
unfolded during the Reagan administration (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2014), a series of
significant legislative changes from 1984 to 1989 led to a decoupling of the AFDC and the child
Medicaid programs. As a result, millions of low-income children became eligible for public
healthcare who would not have received benefits under the old rules.
This paper examines one of the long-term effects of these expansions and focuses on a
singular question: did the expansion of health insurance benefits to low-income children
throughout the 1980s and early 1990s increase state-level high school completion rates around
the turn of the 21st century? Exploration of the other consequences of Medicaid expansions have
received a considerable amount of attention in the academic literature, with studies examining
the short-term impacts on child and maternal health (Aizer et al., 2007; Currie and Grogger,
2002; Currie and Gruber, 1994; Currie and Gruber, 1996a; Currie and Gruber, 1996b; Kaestner,
1999; Lykens and Jargowsky, 2002), the crowd-out of private health insurance (Blumberg et al.,
2000; Busch and Duchovny, 2005; Cutler and Gruber, 1996; De La Mata, 2012; Gruber and
Simon, 2008; Ham and Shore-Sheppard, 2005; Hamersma and Kim, 2013; Lo Sasso and
Buchmueller, 2004; Shore-Sheppard et al., 2000; Shore-Sheppard, 2008), the effects on
academic achievement during early childhood years (Levine and Schanzenbach, 2009), and the
impacts on fertility (DeLeire et al., 2011; Zavodny and Bitler, 2010). However, this present study
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is one of the first to explore whether Medicaid expansions helped to increase the high school
completion rates – the other being the NBER working paper by Cohodes et al. (2014) – and,
moreover, helps to assess whether governmental investments in the form of healthcare for lowincome children can lead to improvements in long-term outcomes for this vulnerable population.
An investigation of the expansions of public health insurance to low-income families is
substantively important due to the sheer size of these programs. In 1984, roughly 17% of all
births in the United States were covered by Medicaid (Howell and Ellwood, 1991), while public
insurance covered roughly 37% of all births after the full set of expansions was implemented in
the early 1990s (MCH Update, 2003). More recently, this rate has grown to almost 48% of all
U.S. births in 2010 (Markus et al., 2013). Thus, health insurance subsidized by the government
covers a very significant proportion of all births in the United States and, moreover, provides
access to healthcare in early childhood for a correspondingly large number of children. Access to
care can allow medical professionals to diagnose and treat health issues in needy children before
they become debilitating and could generate benefits beyond decreased child mortality and
increased birth weight as noted in Currie and Gruber (1996b).
The link between governmental investments in the health of young, low-income children
and the high school completion rates in America is an important one. As education levels and
technological skills become increasingly valued in a specialized U.S. economy (Autor et al.,
2008; Berman et al., 1998; Bresnahan et al., 2002), the long-term prospects for high school
dropouts – both professionally and personally – are rather bleak. Not only are dropouts less
likely than other workers to find stable employment (Apel and Sweeten, 2010; Rumberger and
Lamb, 2003), they are also less prone to the formation of stable nuclear families (Carlson et al.,
2004; Cherlin, 2010; Western and Wildeman, 2009), which can facilitate the intergenerational
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transmission of poverty (Western and Wildeman, 2009; Wilson, 1987). Moreover, those who fail
to earn a degree – especially males – are much more likely to engage in criminal activities
(Blanchflower and Freeman, 2000; Pettit and Western, 2004), which greatly diminishes longterm earning potential (Western et al., 2001) and contributes to the exceptionally high
incarceration rates in the U.S. (Western and Wildeman, 2009). Thus, government investments in
the form of early childhood health insurance for low-income children could conceivably lead to a
population which is better-educated and less reliant upon social welfare programs as adults.
By exploiting the wide degree of heterogeneity in qualification standards for state-level
Medicaid programs – as well as differences in the timing of Medicaid expansions and the
implementation of federal mandates – this paper estimates the intent-to-treat (ITT) effect1 of
Medicaid expansions to low-income children on the subsequent educational attainment of all
public high school students, measured by both the state-level dropout and four-year traditional
graduation rates. More specifically, this paper uses a plausibly exogenous measure of the
generosity of a state’s Medicaid program to estimate the causal effect of increases in the
percentage of child-years potentially covered by the state’s public health insurance program from
conception through age 5.2 Using this simulated eligibility measure – the general form of which
was first proposed by Currie and Gruber in 1994 and then subsequently adopted and adapted by a
number of other researchers (see Currie and Gruber, 1994; Yelowitz, 1995; Currie and Gruber,
1996a; Currie and Gruber, 1996b; Currie and Gruber, 2001; Ham and Shore-Sheppard, 2005;
Gruber and Simon, 2008; DeLeire et al., 2011, Cohodes et al., 2014) – I find that a 10 pp

1

Like other papers in the literature, I consider this an intent-to-treat effect because the focus here is on eligibility
and not the actual causal impact of public health insurance on the long-term graduation rates. The latter, producing
treatment-on-the-treated estimates, would require a panel of individual-level data for all states, which does not exist.
2
Medicaid eligibility is examined through age five for two reasons. First, this paper seeks to examine governmental
investment in the form of public healthcare provided to young, low-income children before they enter primary
school. Secondly, early legislative expansions to women and children in the late 1980s stipulated age 5 as the cutoff
for mandatory Medicaid coverage.
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increase in early childhood years potentially eligible for Medicaid coverage led to a decrease in
long-term high school dropout rates by 1.9 to 2.5 pp and an increase in four-year graduation rates
by 1.0 to 1.3 percentage points.
Findings are consistent across a number of alternative means to measure Medicaid
eligibility and the number of years potentially covered during early childhood and, moreover, are
driven by the two groups benefiting most from the public health insurance expansions: Hispanic
and white students. Since the vast majority of states increased the generosity of their state-level
programs by approximately 25 percentage points, this suggests that high school dropout rates
decreased by roughly 4.75 to 6.25 pp, while traditional four-year graduation rates increased
between 2.5 to 3.25 pp. Framing this last set of findings another way – and considering the base
of roughly 3.8 million potential graduating seniors in the class of 2010 – public health insurance
expansions to low-income children led to an increase of between 95,000 to 124,000 graduates
per year in the U.S. Thus, of the 6 pp increase in the recent high school graduation rate reported
by Murnane (2013), almost half of these gains can be attributed to child Medicaid expansions.
These findings are both statistically and economically significant.

2.

The Medicaid Program and Eligibility Expansions
A number of authors have detailed the history of the Medicaid program,3 as well as the

coverage expansions impacting eligibility across the United States throughout the 1980s and
early 1990s. Arguably, Gruber’s 2003 book chapter, aptly titled “Medicaid”, provides the most

3

The Medicaid program dates back to 1965 when the program was officially enacted by Congress as part of
President Johnson’s Great Society Program. From its inception, Medicaid was a state and federal partnership,
whereby participating states received federal grants to help offset a portion of total program costs borne at the statelevel. To receive federal funds, states were required to cover select sub-populations, such as individuals qualifying
for AFDC, and states could choose to add other groups it deemed as medically needy. By 1972, all states except
Arizona had created state-run Medicaid programs; Arizona opted into the program on a limited scale in 1982, only
to expand coverage shortly thereafter.
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comprehensive overview. Given these resources, this section highlights the significant
benchmarks and provisions of these public health insurance expansions that are most relevant to
the fundamental research question of this paper.4 Two notes regarding the evolution of Medicaid
programs are particularly important to this paper. First, the bundle of goods and services
provided by Medicaid are comprehensive and standardized across all states. Secondly, increases
in eligibility stem from two key legislative changes: (1) the removal of the family structure
restrictions from benefit receipt, and (2) the tying of income thresholds to some function of the
federal poverty level rather than the AFDC payment standard established by the state.

2.1.

The Scope of Medical Care Provided by Medicaid
As part of the agreement to receive federal funds, the government required that states

provide a relatively standardized bundle of goods and services provided under their Medicaid
program. Thus, potential medical treatment received during the early childhood years should
have been roughly equivalent regardless of the state of residence for children evaluated in this
analysis. This is important because the quality of “treatment” evaluated in this analysis should
not be strongly dependent upon geography, conditional on time. Consequently, “generosity” in
this paper refers to the number of children potentially eligible for public insurance and not the
quality of medical treatment possibly received.
Concerning these legislated benefits over the duration of the program, medical coverage
provided has been comprehensive: the wide range of services included physician care, inpatient
and outpatient hospital procedures, laboratory and x-ray services, as well as access to skilled

This overview draws heavily upon the historical overview provided in the Kaiser Family Foundation’s publication
“Medicaid: A Timeline of Key Developments” (2013) and reports published by the old U.S. General Accounting
Office (1991)– a more detailed summary of the developments in Medicaid coverage can be found in Appendix A.
4
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nursing facilities. A critical component of this coverage as it applies to health investments in
low-income children are the Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnostic, and Treatment (EPSDT)
services, which were enacted under the Social Security Mandates of 1967, and provide
preventative and treatment services including dental, vision, hearing, and mental health. As the
name implies, the goals of the EPSDT program are to identify health problems starting at birth,
to keep monitoring the development of the child at regular intervals, and to treat the problems
once they are discovered. So, where low-income children without Medicaid benefits may wait
years to receive a diagnosis and treatment, children with coverage are more likely to receive help
in their infancy. In turn, this could potentially eliminate or reduce the negative impact of
debilitating conditions and increase cognitive development during the formative years of early
childhood.

2.2.

Determinants of Medicaid Eligibility
During Medicaid’s early period, the vast majority of those covered by Medicaid received

benefits based upon their qualification for AFDC benefits within a particular state. Due to the
wide range of criteria used to determine AFDC qualification, a large number of poor children
were excluded from public health insurance in the early period because of family structure or
income requirements legislated at the state level.
Historically, qualification for AFDC typically precluded the presence of able-bodied
males within the household. This means that low-income children residing within two-parent,
nuclear families were typically not eligible for Medicaid benefits and that AFDC was essentially
a program for low-income, single parents. Acknowledging the distortive effects of this policy,
legislative changes sought to break this link between AFDC receipt and child Medicaid by
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expanding eligibility to all children below some multiple of the federal poverty guideline,
regardless of family structure type. As Figure 1 notes, Hispanic and white children are most
likely to reside in two-parent, married families during their early childhood years. Thus, they are
the two groups most likely to benefit from the removal of the family structure restrictions on
child Medicaid receipt.
Furthermore, since individual states determined the need and payment standards under
the state-level AFDC programs, there was tremendous variation in the income level that qualified
single-parent families for benefits during the early period of the Medicaid program. For example,
Alabama’s monthly need standard for a family of 3 in 1980 was $192 in nominal dollars,
whereas the standard for a high-threshold state such as Vermont was $670. A comparison of
these values to the federal poverty guideline of approximately $520 per month for a family of
three at the same point in time reveal the potential for a significant number of poor children and
families not qualifying for AFDC benefits and Medicaid simply because their states had chosen a
low threshold to determine the “needy”.
While minor changes to rules governing Medicaid eligibility occurred before the 1980s, 5
the bulk of the coverage expansions occurred during the mid to late 1980s and early 1990s –
which were the early childhood years for students graduating after the turn of the 21st century.
Under a number of legislative acts which sought to simultaneously limit federal expenditures and
expand Medicaid coverage to needy populations during the Reagan administration,6 Medicaid

Despite the failure of President Carter’s push to expand coverage to low-income children under the age of 6 who
did not qualify for insurance under current state laws in the late 1970s, the notions of separating welfare receipt from
Medicaid qualification and the expansion of coverage during early childhood – defined as conception through age 5
– help set the agenda for comprehensive expansions of the 1980s.
6
Important measures included the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (OBRA81), the Deficit Reduction
Act of 1984, the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA85), the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1986 (OBRA86), the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 (OBRA87), the Medicare
Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988 (MCCA88), and the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 (OBRA89).
5
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eligibility was extended to a large set of low-income children during early childhood and to their
mothers during pregnancy. Details of these incremental expansions have been highlighted in a
number of publications (in particular, see Currie and Gruber, 1994; Yelowitz, 1995; Currie and
Gruber, 1996a; Currie and Gruber, 1996b) and, thus, I refer the interested reader to Appendix A
for more information regarding the key developments in Medicaid expansions to low-income
children which affected cohorts examined within this analysis. The key note is that – after the
full enactment of the sweeping mandates throughout the 1980s – Medicaid for children in the
United States had completed its transition from an optional state program, which was typically
tied to AFDC receipt, to a stand-alone program which potentially covered all children at or
below some federally mandated multiple of the federal poverty line, regardless of family
structure type.

3.

Theoretical Framework
This is an early childhood investments paper which examines governmental expenditures

impacting children before they enter primary school. As such, the main mechanisms through
which access to public health insurance for low-income children could raise the long-term
human capital accumulation is a healthier childhood and increased cognitive and non-cognitive
development during the formative years of early childhood. By being able to diagnose and treat
aliments afflicting low-income children earlier in their development via Medicaid’s EPSDT
program, low-income children with access to Medicaid may not only be better prepared to enter
school because of increased development in their early years, but they might miss fewer days of
school once entering primary school relative to those without access to insurance. These two
factors, in turn, should increase their long-term performance relative to equivalent students
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without insurance and, perhaps, increase their odds of obtaining a high school diploma, holding
all else equal.
Several studies have linked healthcare access to health improvements.7 Currie and Gruber
(1996b) find that the Medicaid expansions that included pregnant women over the period 1979 to
1992 substantially decreased the incidence of infant mortality8 and decreased the probability of a
low birth weight baby. This finding was confirmed by Levin and Schanzenbach (2009). While
the benefits of decreased infant mortality are clear, it is important to note that low birth weight
has been linked to a host of long-term health issues for the child (Barker et al., 1989; Gluckman
and Hanson, 2004), as well as lower reading and math scores during childhood (Chatterji et al.,
2014) and decreased levels of education and employability as adults (Currie and Hyson, 1999).
In another paper, Currie and Gruber linked Medicaid expansions to increases in healthcare
utilization by the low-income population (Currie and Gruber, 1996a), a finding which was
confirmed again in Currie and Gruber (2001). While they report that take-up of public insurance
was less than 100% – e.g., a number of families qualified for Medicaid insurance but did not
formally apply for benefits – they report high levels of medical care utilization, especially
preventative care delivered in the offices of physicians. Thus, low-income children appeared to
be using the care afforded to them under the Medicaid expansions and received treatments in
excess of what they would have experienced in the absence of the eligibility extensions.
As a result of their access to care earlier in their lifecycle, low-income insured children
experience fewer avoidable hospitalizations than children without insurance (Dafny and Gruber,

7

In a recent literature review, Levy and Meltzer (2008) examine the causal link between health insurance coverage
and health and conclude that “the evidence available to date conclusively demonstrates that health insurance
improves the health of vulnerable subpopulations such as infants, children…”
8
As noted by Currie and Gruber (1996b), Medicaid expansions to pregnant women and children stemmed, in part,
from a desire of politicians to address the infant mortality rate in the U.S., which was among the highest in the
industrialized world.
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2005), which is presumably beneficial not only for the child’s long-term development but can
decrease the financial burden placed on the family (Gross and Notowidigdo, 2011; Finkelstein et
al., 2012), as well as other consumers of healthcare services in the case of non-payment by the
low-income family. Finally, a number of other studies and reviews have argued that access to
medical care for low-income children improves their health during childhood. See Currie and
Almond (2011), Gruber (1997), and Lykens and Jargowsky (2002) for further evidence
supporting this link.
Comparatively fewer studies have examined the relationship between expansions of
public health insurance and cognitive development during early childhood or other longer-term
outcomes. This is due, in part, to the fact that many of the low-income children affected by
Medicaid expansions are only now reaching adulthood. Levine and Schanenbach (2009) show
that better health status at birth – as proxied by low birth weight and infant mortality – is related
to improvements in 4th and 8th grade reading achievement. They use data from the National
Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), a version of Currie and Gruber’s simulated
benefits, and a triple-difference identification strategy. Two other recent working papers have
also investigated topics central to the theme in this one. Brown et al. (2014) use linked Internal
Revenue Service data to report a positive impact of child Medicaid expansions on longer-term
labor force earnings.
The current NBER working paper by Cohodes et al. (2014) is most similar in spirit to this
work. They also utilize a form of Currie and Gruber’s simulated Medicaid eligibility to study the
effect of public health insurance expansions to low-income children aged 0 to 17 on high school
and college completion rates. Using data from the 2005-2012 American Community Survey, the
authors find that federal expansions led to declines in the high school non-completion rate of
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approximately 4.0 to 5.9% and, furthermore, that the gains were confined to non-whites. This
analysis complements and extends Cohodes et al.’s work in a number of ways. First, this paper
concentrates – and isolates – impacts of public health insurance expansions on early childhood
only, as opposed to ages 0 to 17, and exploits a longer panel to produce more precise estimates of
the impacts on the public high school completion rates. The longer panel is particularly
important to establish a sufficient baseline before the family structure restrictions for Medicaid
receipt were rescinded which, as noted, differentially affects individual race and ethnic groups.
This paper also contains two measures of public high school completion which were not
analyzed in Cohodes et al.’s work: dropout rates using Current Population Survey (CPS) data
and the traditional four-year high school graduation rate using data from the Common Core of
Data (CCD). In particular, the restriction of the sample to individuals born in the U.S. increases
the precision of the dropout estimates, because it isolates changes in trends only applicable to
students who could have qualified for the public health insurance expansions throughout their
entire early childhood. Analysis of CCD data reveals that increased completion rates applies to
traditional diplomas, rather than simply increases in the number of General Education
Development (GED) holders. This is important because GED holders do not fare better in the
labor market relative to high school dropouts (Cameron and Heckman, 1993; Boesel et al.,
1998), and, consequently, gains in completion rates reveal real improvements in human capital.
Finally, unlike Cohodes et al. (2014), I find that gains in completion rates are driven by
Hispanics and whites. By estimating models by race and ethnic group, the identification strategy
used in this paper explicitly addresses a potential limitation of the other study, which is that gains
by “non-whites” are driven by increases in the proportion of Asian students over time – which
have historically had completion rates more similar to whites. In other words, the authors may be
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missing a significant compositional change correlated with Medicaid expansions within their
classification of a “non-white” group. Those caveats aside, the consistency in findings across
these papers indicate that benefits from child Medicaid expansions are real and substantial.

4.

Data
Data in this analysis come from three general sources: demographic information in the

Current Population Survey, education statistics from the Common Core of Data, and a database
of state rules used to determine Medicaid eligibility. The first source, the CPS, is a monthly
survey of roughly 60,000 dwellings across the United States conducted by the U.S. Census
Bureau for the Bureau of Labor Statistics.9 While data collected in this survey serve as the basis
of the government’s monthly estimate of the unemployment rate, researchers frequently use it to
investigate issues pertaining to educational attainment, family structure, and family income. Data
from the CPS are used in two segments of this analysis. Monthly CPS data are used to calculate
the dropout rates for individuals aged 18 to 20. Estimates are examined from 1994 to 2010,
which allows a number of years to establish a baseline in each state before the large-scale
Medicaid eligibility expansions. March CPS data are used to simulate the generosity of a state’s
Medicaid program by comparing family unit structure and income to eligibility rules established
within a particular state. More details regarding this simulation are supplied shortly and technical
details can be found in Appendix B.
The second source of data, the Common Core of Data comes from a repository of
educational data maintained by the U.S. Department of Education’s National Center for
Education Statistics (NCES). NCES collects both fiscal and non-fiscal data from all public

9

Monthly Current Population Survey data was downloaded from IPUMS-CPS. See www.ipums.org.
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schools in the United States on an annual basis, including the number of traditional diplomas
awarded and student enrollment by grade level. Data are supplied directly from state education
agencies and uploaded to the CCD; I use the public-use, state-level data in the calculation of
four-year high school graduation rates. Diploma and enrollment figures were first documented
by the CCD in the early 1990s which means that, given the lag structure required to measure the
four-year graduation rate, the first graduation cohort for which a rate can be estimated is 1997.
This allows for the construction of a minimal pre-period before the large-scale Medicaid
mandates begin impacting children during early childhood years.
Finally, a number of resources were used to compile a database of the rules used to
determine Medicaid eligibility for pregnant women and children in each state from 1975 to 1997
(Currie and Gruber, 1994; Hill, 1992; Kaiser Family Foundation, various publications; The
National Governors Association, various publications; U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, various publications). This 20-plus year period covers the early childhood years for the
graduation cohorts from the class of 1994 to the class of 2010. As with the other variables, more
details regarding this database are provided in the forthcoming sections.

5.

Empirical Strategy
This section outlines three vital components of this empirical analysis. It starts with a

general discussion of the requirements for the identification of a casual effect of increased access
to public health insurance for low-income children on the long-term public high school
completion rates. Other portions describe the construction and findings from the two variables of
central importance in this paper: the simulation of the generosity of the state-level Medicaid
program, and the estimation of public high school completion rates in the United States.
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5.1.

Identification of a Causal Effect
This paper builds off of literature which uses estimates of the generosity of a state’s

Medicaid program for children as a time-varying, exogenous source of variation in a quasiexperimental research design (Currie and Gruber, 1994; Yelowitz, 1995; Currie and Gruber,
1996a; Currie and Gruber, 1996b; Currie and Gruber, 2001; Ham and Shore-Sheppard, 2005;
Gruber and Simon, 2008; DeLeire et al., 2011; Cohodes et al., 2014). Employing a form of the
methodology adopted by these authors, I combine fixed-effects modeling with simulated
Medicaid eligibility – using a nationally representative sample of CPS data and the eligibility
requirements of state-level programs – to investigate the causal impact of healthcare expansions
to low-income children on the subsequent high school completion rates. Exploiting the timing of
Medicaid expansions to women and children, which varied significantly across geographic areas
in terms of the percentage of the population potentially eligible, I estimate an intent-to-treat
(ITT) effect of these expansions on the high school completion rates. The general estimation
strategy can be written as follows:
% 𝑬𝒂𝒓𝒍𝒚 𝑪𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒅𝒉𝒐𝒐𝒅 𝒀𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒔
(𝟏) (𝑪𝒐𝒎𝒑𝒍𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑹𝒂𝒕𝒆)𝒔𝒄𝒈 = 𝜶 + 𝜷 (
) + 𝜹𝒔 + 𝜻𝒄 + 𝝃𝒈 + 𝜺𝒔𝒄𝒈
𝑬𝒍𝒊𝒈𝒊𝒃𝒊𝒍𝒆 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝑴𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒊𝒅 𝒔𝒄𝒈
where:

Completion Rate is measured by either the CPS dropout or CCD graduation rate for a
given state (s), cohort (c), and race/ethnic group (g);
% Early Childhood Years Eligible for Medicaid is the percentage of all early
childhood years potentially eligible for Medicaid under existing state laws for a
particular race/ethnic group in a graduation cohort;
δs, ζc, and ξg are state, cohort, and race/ethnic group fixed effects, respectively,
εscg is the error term, which is clustered at the state level, and
all models are weighted by the number of relevant individuals residing in a state for a
particular cohort and group.

The major challenge in this research is to construct a plausibly exogenous measure of the
generosity of a state’s Medicaid program during early childhood. Since this variable is the key to
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my identification strategy and any causal claims, I discuss issues in estimation and potential
empirical solutions, as well as describe – in detail and in a separate section – the estimation
procedure used to simulate this variable. As is common in quasi-experimental research designs,
two major sources of bias in the estimation of β are particularly relevant: (1) simultaneity
between the outcome and main explanatory variables, and (2) other forms of omitted variable
bias.
The main concern with using actual Medicaid use rather than a measure of the generosity
of the rules governing access to the state-level plan is that strategic behavior by local residents
can lead to changes in Medicaid enrollment (e.g., local residents choose an income level to
qualify for benefits), yet this does not represent a real change in access to public healthcare.
Consequently, and considering the within-estimator specified in the fixed-effects model above,
an “effect” could be attributed to this strategic behavior by the child’s parents, which could be
influenced by third factors impacting completion rates.10 A more convincing independent
variable is one which is exogenously determined from the vantage point of the aggregated
individuals within a state. Therefore, a covariate based upon the series of federal mandates
leading to legislative changes in access to state-level child Medicaid programs could provide an
exogenous measure of program generosity.
Restating the problem more generally, actual Medicaid use is probably correlated with
other factors impacting early childhood health, the probability of family income falling below
specified income levels, and high school completion rates. Consequently, Medicaid utilization is
likely endogenous; DeLeire et al. (2011) provide a comprehensive, recent discussion of why

One example: parents’ education level, which may be a function of the ability endowments they bestow to the
child, affects their potential earnings level. This, in turn, could influence their choice of an income level, one which
qualifies them for the public insurance program.
10
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other techniques must be employed. Given this issue of endogeneity, I adopt a form of the
methodology established in the literature and use individual-level data to simulate the percentage
of all March CPS sample children who would have qualified under a state’s eligibility
requirements in a given year, regardless of where they reside. This procedure yields a measure of
the state plan’s generosity because it is not dependent upon the characteristics or choices of the
residents currently living within that state but simply the eligibility requirements established by
the state legislators,11 which were determined, in part, by federal mandates. Details regarding
these simulations are provided in the next subsection and, moreover, a host of alternative
estimation strategies are examined in the robustness checks section to analyze the sensitivity of
my estimates to different simulation choices.
Other types of omitted variables can result in biased estimates of the relationship between
Medicaid expansions and the high school completion rates. To isolate a causal effect after
constructing the plausibly exogenous measure of the generosity of a state’s Medicaid program,
other variables potentially linked with Medicaid eligibility during the formative early childhood
years and graduation rates more than a decade later must be included. Unfortunately, it is
theoretically unclear as to what variables could be correlated and when they should be measured.
Given this conceptual ambiguity, I choose to address these other forms of omitted variable bias
through a variety of econometric demeaning techniques – including fixed effects and time trends
– and to test the sensitivity of my finding under a range of definitions of Medicaid generosity.
Fixed effects address a number of potentially relevant, unobserved factors in this
analysis. Given that states can differ in their historical completion rates for a variety of reasons,

11

In addition, the values produced in the simulation are meaningful in a statistical sense, especially when
considering a within-state analysis. For example, a simulated value of 20% means that the program is twice as
generous as programs where only 10% of the early childhood years for a given cohort are potentially coverable by
Medicaid.
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state-specific fixed effects can be used to account for factors which are time-invariant within a
given state (such as general levels of spending per pupil or general marginal propensities of
graduation). Race/ethnic group fixed effects hold constant for historical gaps in high school
completion rates which may affect black, Hispanic, and white students at an aggregated level
(e.g., across the entire U.S.), regardless of the time period. Extending these two constructs, staterace fixed effects are an even more flexible form of state-specific and race/ethnic group fixed
effects. They control for differential graduation levels by race/ethnic groups residing within the
same state. In other words, this functional form allows whites in Alabama to have historically
different graduation rates than black students in that same state and, importantly, this racial
differential – if existing – can vary in magnitude by the individual state.
Cohort-specific fixed effects can be used to control for macro factors affecting graduation
trends in a particular year, such as the economy or binding federal education mandates. Modeling
with state, cohort, and race/ethnic group fixed effects – which are indicated by δs, ζc, and ξg in
Equation 2 – imply that identification of an impact rests upon the comparison of graduation rates
within a state for cohorts exposed to varying levels of Medicaid generosity during early
childhood, while simultaneously controlling for (1) unobserved factors affecting all students at a
macro level within a chosen cohort, and (2) general differentials in propensities to complete high
school for each race/ethnic group. Stated differently, if all states are experiencing increases in
both high school completion and Medicaid eligibility (which they generally are), then
identification of a positive estimate of β occurs only if states with greater increases in the
generosity of their state Medicaid programs also experience larger increases in their long-term
high school completion rates. Modeling with state-race fixed effects is interpreted similarly, but
identification now occurs from changes within a state-race group rather than only a state.
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In addition to controlling for time-invariant unobservables, other strategies account for
the possibility that graduation rates are evolving differently across states. State-specific time
trends identify impacts of Medicaid expansions only when high school completion rates exceed
the level which would have been expected after controlling for the existing trends in
completion.12 Secondly, state-cohort fixed effects fully drop the linearity assumption implicit in
the use of time trends. Under this specification, an effect is identified when increases in
Medicaid generosity to a particular race or ethnic group residing within a state result in greater
than anticipated gains in the high school completion rates, after accounting for all other factors.
In other words, it can test whether the group receiving the greatest gains in access to public
healthcare also experience the largest increases in completion rates. When included with the
other techniques discussed above, this specification is the most stringent test of an effect and,
potentially, the most convincing estimate of a causal impact because it can capture time-varying,
unobserved factors at the state-level. All of these fixed-effects methods can significantly reduce
the probability of an important omitted variable biasing estimation relative to the form presented
in equation 1 above.

5.2.

Medicaid Eligibility Simulations
Having addressed the challenges in estimating a causal relationship between increases in

the generosity of state-level child Medicaid programs and longer-term high school completion
rates, it is useful to discuss a few elements of the simulation process. Appendix B contains a
number of technical details required to accurately estimate the generosity of the state-level
Medicaid program – as proxied by the percentage of children in a graduation cohort who would

12

Since the panel of data used in this analysis is long, I allow for quadratic time trends. Results are similar in
magnitude when estimated with linear time trends.
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have been eligible for Medicaid during their early childhood years. This section broadly covers
two steps used in this process: (1) the construction of a Medicaid eligibility rules database, and
(2) the simulation of program generosity using CPS sample data.
The first step in the Medicaid eligibility simulation process is to properly document and
categorize the large volume of legislative changes affecting qualification for child Medicaid and
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) from 1975 to 1997, which covered the early
childhood years for the graduation cohorts from 1994 to 2010.13 Over the range analyzed, there
was a large degree of heterogeneity in the laws governing qualification for Medicaid benefits for
both pregnant women and children. Timing and stipulations governing the access to care
appeared to be essentially random from the perspective of individuals living within a state until
the federal mandates became binding at various junctures. And, as noted, the removal of the
family structure restrictions is particularly important for certain race/ethnic groups. These
differences provide the exploitable source of variation which can identify coefficients in a causal
analysis.
Once this database of state-level requirements for Medicaid qualification is compiled, the
second major phase is to use data from the March CPS to estimate the generosity of a state’s
Medicaid program during a cohort’s early childhood years. Like other researchers in the
academic literature – most notably Currie and Gruber (1994, 1996a, 1996b), I use a national
sample of March CPS children age 0 to 5 – e.g., all children regardless of their original home
state and early childhood age14 – and statistically ask the question: conditional on their family

13

See Table 1 for more detail regarding the ages and years required to estimate eligibility for all cohorts in the
sample.
14
Parents in the CPS data appear to become wealthier as their children age. Thus, to avoid eligibility changes
resulting from a changing demographic, the same sample of children aged 0 to 5 are used to simulate eligibility for
all early childhood years estimated from a single March CPS following the mapping outline in Table 1.
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structure and family income level, would they have qualified for Medicaid had they lived in a
particular state in a given year?15 As Table 1 outlines, I perform this exercise for seven different
CPS years for a single cohort – from conception through age 5 – and then take the simple
average of these seven years to define the variable % of Early Childhood Years with Medicaid
Eligibility.16 Mathematically, this calculation for a particular state (s) and graduation cohort (c)
can be written as follows:
𝑐−13

∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝐶𝑃𝑆 𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑖 ∗ 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑖𝑑 𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑠
1
% 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠
(2) (
) = [ ∑
]
𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑖𝑑 𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑠𝑐 7
∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝐶𝑃𝑆 𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑖
𝑦=𝑐−19

where:

the simulation is estimated from cohort c=1994 to c=2010;
i represents an individual March CPS observations from year (y) for a child aged 0 to 5;
Medicaid Eligibility is an indicator variable which is 1 when the family unit or
individual child qualified for Medicaid benefits under a particular state (s) legislative
thresholds and 0 otherwise; and
CPS Weight are person weights reported by the March CPS.

The corresponding output from Equation 3 is the average number of child-years potentially
coverable by a state Medicaid program for a nationally representative sample of children. This is
a plausibly exogenous measure of the generosity of a state’s Medicaid program during early
childhood for reasons outlined earlier in this text. Moreover, the simulation methodology
outlined above can be easily altered to estimate eligibility by race and ethnic group.
The simulation contains three assumptions which are important to disclose. To start, the
use of equal weights for each early childhood year contains the implicit supposition that each

15

Families were defined by the most disaggregated units identified within the CPS data. Total family income less
certain time-varying disregards were compared to income thresholds established by the individual state.
16
The CPS and CCD do not provide the individual-level data required to simulate early childhood eligibility. As
such, I need to make the assumption that students graduate, on average, at age 18 and benefits during early
childhood are covered by the March CPS years as outlined in Table 1. This assumption should not be problematic so
long as the age composition of the graduation class is not changing greatly from the class of 1994 to the class of
2010 in a given state. Moreover, the size of the expansions in the latter period, the smoothing of the estimates over
the seven early childhood years, and the use of the within-estimation in the fixed-effects estimation should further
mitigate any concerns over this procedure.
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year of potential Medicaid coverage is uniformly important to a child’s development and longterm probability of high school completion. This enters equation 2 through the 1/7 term.
Although insurance coverage could be more important earlier in a child’s development, it is
theoretically unclear how the years from conception through age 5 should be weighted. Due to
this ambiguity, I examine other potential measures to test the sensitivity of my preferred
estimation strategy.
Two other assumptions stem from the lack of administrative or individual-level data
following the potential graduate from early childhood through their high school years. The first
is that any potential distortions in estimation from individuals migrating from state to state are
minimal. Selective migration towards states with more generous Medicaid programs would cloud
the relationship between those with eligibility increases and those not benefiting from legislative
changes. Most likely, this would lead to attenuation bias in estimation due to misclassification
error. Secondly, as an important reminder, I make the additional assumption that potential
graduates would have finished at age 18, on average, as outlined in Table 1. This allows me to
match the early childhood years in a consistent manner across cohorts but could also lead to
misclassification error and attenuation bias in estimation if this central tendency is changing over
time.
Those caveats aside, the simulated percent of early childhood years with Medicaid
eligibility are shown, by state and for all children, in Appendix Table C1. Some important items
to recall when interpreting these numbers: simulated values are estimated by graduation cohort
and the value reported is the number of child-years potentially covered by Medicaid from
conception through age 5. Estimates are a quantifiable and comparable measure of a state
Medicaid program’s generosity over time. Examples can help clarify the interpretation of this

Page 22 of 70

variable: 10.9% for Alabama’s class of 1997 indicates that 10.9% of the early childhood years
for the national sample of CPS children would have been covered under Alabama’s eligibility
requirements for child Medicaid. Under the eligibility simulation method established in the
literature, the same exact CPS children are also run through the eligibility requirements for all
other states in the same year and, as in places like California at 20.2% or Arizona at 4.4%, the
percent of child-years covered can be higher or lower depending upon the state-level eligibility
requirements. Thus, these simulations quantify the generosity of coverage in the various statelevel Medicaid programs for the same set of low-income children during early childhood. In this
table, all states experience a marked increase in the percentage of early childhood years covered,
which occur, in part, as the federal coverage minimums become binding.
Similar tables were generated by race and ethnic group and are shown in Tables C2
through C4 in the appendix. These are the simulated values used in the core empirical
modeling.17 Figure 2 summarizes these tables with an aggregated depiction of the increases in
the generosity of the average state’s Medicaid program during early childhood for all U.S. states
and by race and ethnic group. Not surprisingly, access to public health insurance increases
markedly over time. Another striking feature of this graph is the change in eligibility impacting
the average Hispanic student. Over the period examined, Hispanic students were often raised in
families with marital patterns most resembling whites, but with incomes most closely
characterized by blacks. Thus, their estimated Medicaid eligibility during early childhood begins
closer to whites. However, as family structure restrictions from child Medicaid are lifted, the
fraction of early childhood years increases markedly for Hispanics and converges toward blacks
at the end of the sample. This is an important source of exploitable variation.

17

Other methods of Medicaid eligibility simulation are examined to reveal the sensitivity of estimates to key
modeling choices.

Page 23 of 70

5.3.

The Outcome Variables: High School Completion Rates in the United States
The primary goal of this paper is to investigate the causal impact of a single public policy

decision – the expansion of health insurance coverage to low-income children – on long-term
dropout and traditional four-year high school graduation rates. Given this singular objective, the
next two sub-sections bypass the multitude of factors affecting completion trends over the past
several of decades.18 Instead, the first section describes important choices made in the
construction of the two rates, as well as outlines the strengths and weaknesses of each measure.
More technical details regarding the construction of both measures can be found in Appendix B.
The second sub-section contains a general discussion of the trends in U.S. dropout and traditional
four-year high school graduation rates from the mid-1990s into the 2000s.

5.3.1. Estimation of Dropout and Graduation Rates
Despite being a widely reported statistics used as a barometer for the effectiveness of the
public school system, estimation of U.S. high school completion rates is not straightforward,
primarily due to conceptual ambiguities and data limitations.19 Given these challenges, I present
and discuss two measures of public high school completion, each of which has strengths and
weaknesses. Analyzing both constructs together exposes the true nature of the relationship
between child Medicaid expansions and the long-term human capital investments of low-income
children.

18

For those interested in other factors affecting dropout rates in the United States, see the relatively recent, thorough
review by Rumberger and Lim (2008). Murnane (2013) also provides a comprehensive analysis of the challenges
and trends associated with the public high school graduation rate.
19
For a comprehensive discussion of the challenges associated with the estimation of completion rates, please see
Heckman and LaFontaine (2010).
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As previously noted, cohort-specific dropout rates were computed using monthly data
taken from the Current Population Survey. As with the Medicaid eligibility simulations, Table 1
outlines how individuals of a particular age were assigned to a graduation cohort, which is
defined by when the average student would have turned 18. Two other conditions were used to
estimate the dropout rate.20 Instead of using only age 18 in the construction of dropout rates, the
CPS estimates were smoothed by using all sample individuals aged 18 to 20. This approach
yields a more accurate estimation of dropout rates for minority groups living in predominately
white states because the sample size is greatly increased. Secondly, since the research objective
in this paper is to explore the impact of increased access to public healthcare in early childhood,
dropout rates are estimated only on CPS respondents who were born in the United States. Lowincome children not born in the U.S. would most likely either (1) not qualify for public health
insurance because of residency requirements, or (2) have some significant delay in access to care
during early childhood. While estimates for black and white students are not impacted by this
restriction, the magnitude, but not general trends, of dropout rates for Hispanics are. Again,
please refer to the technical details in Appendix B for more information.
While CPS dropout rates have the advantage that one can exclude respondents not living
in the U.S. at the time of their birth – and thus, those may not fully benefit from Medicaid
expansions during early childhood – this measure has two other disadvantages. The first is that
researchers cannot exclude the GED certificate. The GED is the most common alternative to a
traditional high school diploma; however, studies have argued that GED holders do not fare any
better in the labor market than high school dropouts (Cameron and Heckman, 1993; Boesel et al.,

20

As is standard in the literature, a dropout is identified when the CPS respondent has less than a high school level
of education and is no longer enrolled in school.
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1998).21,22 Consequently, care must be taken in the conclusions drawn from an analysis of
dropout rates if the percentage of GED holders is increasing over time; this would indicate a
decrease in the dropout rate which is not a real long-term gain in human capital.
The second limitation is that the CPS sampling design excludes institutionalized
populations. This could be problematic if the sample captured by the CPS is changing
significantly over time due to factors such as mass incarceration. If the boom in U.S. prison
population differentially impacts racial groups or individuals on the margin of graduation, which
it most likely does, then CPS estimates serve as an upper-bound of the true rates. Furthermore,
rates could be artificially higher in the later period if dropouts are more likely to be excluded
from the CPS sample due to these changing trends in incarceration.
Given the potential limitations of the CPS dropout rate due to the use of the 18-20 year
old smoothing technique, the non-excludability of non-traditional diplomas, and the nonsampling of institutionalized populations, a second outcome variable is examined. This measure
concentrates on diplomas awarded in the traditional manner: e.g., students who attended an
accredited high school program and received a traditional high school diploma, as discussed in
Heckman and LaFontaine (2010). Following Heckman and LaFontaine (2010), I estimate a fouryear graduation rate using diploma counts and enrollment data from the Common Core of Data.
In this calculation, a graduation cohort (e.g., the Class of 2000) is defined by the number of
diplomas awarded in a state in a given year. Thus, diplomas awarded are the numerator. To
estimate four-year graduation rates, the number of 8th graders enrolled in that same state 4 years

21

This effect is generally attributed to the general lack of non-cognitive skills characteristically held by these
individuals, such as perseverance and motivation, traits which are essential to success in the academic and
professional arenas (Heckman and LaFontaine, 2010).
22
Furthermore, the federal government has formally recognized the non-substitutability between GED and
traditional high school diplomas by excluding GED holders from the count of high school graduates under No Child
Left Behind (NCLB) measures.
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earlier is used as the proxy for the maximum number of potential completers. These enrollees are
used as the denominator from which a four-year graduation rate can be constructed. Please see
the technical appendix for more details.
While addressing the GED issue, the traditional diploma measure introduces two other
limitations. First, students born outside of the United States – and, thus, most likely not
qualifying for Medicaid benefits during early childhood – cannot be excluded. Secondly, an
implicit assumption of using the four-year graduation measure, especially while using fixedeffects regression modeling, is that any measurement error needs to remain constant over time.
When students do not all finish in exactly four years, measurement error on the outcome variable
is a potential problem.23 Under this scenario, degree duration would be an omitted third factor.
When correlated with the primary covariate of interest, regression estimates would be biased.
Unfortunately, given data restrictions,24 there is no way to explicitly test the assumption of a
constant number of years required for completion within a particular state. Thus, I discuss the
direction of the potential bias later in this paper.
Neither outcome variable flawlessly captures the trends in public high school completion
rates which are most relevant to the child Medicaid expansions of the 1980s and early 1990s.
However, the two measures are complementary, strengthening one where the other fails. Thus,
consistency in findings from the two measures would establish whether a statistically significant
and robust relationship exists between public healthcare expansions to low-income children in
early childhood and long-term gains in the high school completion rates.

23

In other words, and illustrating via an example, so long as students take, on average, 4.10 years to graduate in
Alabama over the period explored in this analysis, then the same level of mismeasurement occurs across each time
period, which can be controlled for via standard econometric procedures. A concern would be that the average time
towards high school completion is time-varying within a state – e.g., that the time spent towards graduation in the
earlier period is statistically different from the amount required in the latter period.
24
To test this proposition, one would need administrative-level data across all states over a long period of time. This
data is not available at a national level.
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5.3.2. U.S. Trends in the Dropout and Four-Year Graduation Rates
Trends in 18 to 20 year old dropout rates by race and ethnic group are shown in Figure 3.
As displayed, rates appear to be flat in the early period and then fall dramatically after the turn of
the century. All groups experience large declines in their dropout rates. At an aggregated level,
dropout rates for all students fall from approximately 14% in 1994 to 9% in 2010. This
represents roughly a 35% decline relative to the original baseline established during the period
before the large-scale increases in public healthcare access to low-income children.
Figure 4 presents trends in traditional four-year high school graduation rates for the 1997
to 2010 graduation cohorts for all U.S. students, and by race and ethnic groups. Graduation rates
at the aggregate level for all students have generally experienced an upward trajectory in the
2000s, starting at roughly 76% in 2000 and exceeding 82% by 2010.25 Like dropout rates,
improvements were experienced by all groups: black, Hispanic, and white students all
experienced marked gains in their graduation rates throughout this period. The primary objective
of this paper is to measure the extent to which these advances in completion rates at statespecific levels can be attributable to early childhood Medicaid expansions.

6.

Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 contains a series of descriptive statistics for the data used to estimate the

empirical models. Results are presented for all U.S. students, as well as separately by race and
ethnic group. As noted earlier, Medicaid eligibility is estimated by the group of students, which
means that the fraction of black, Hispanic, and white students which would have qualified for a
state’s Medicaid program had they lived in a given state during early childhood varies markedly

25

These trends and estimates are consistent with those presented by Heckman and LaFontaine (2010).
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across both group and cohort. This time-varying measure of Medicaid program generosity at the
state level is the identifying source of variation exploited in this analysis, and the fraction of CPS
children qualifying for the average state’s Medicaid program in early childhood is contained in
the third column. Medicaid eligibility rises from approximately 15% of all child-years in the first
graduation cohort (1994) to above 40% by the end of the period analyzed (2010). These
generosity increases represent almost 2.8 times more child-years eligible for Medicaid.
Table 2 reveals the magnitude by which Medicaid eligibility increases vary across race
and ethnic groups. At the start of the time-series, the average black student in this analysis had
40.4% of their early childhood years potentially coverable by Medicaid. By 2010, this number
rose to 70.0%. While large in absolute magnitude, this change corresponds to less than a
doubling of program generosity. Thus, the marked within-group increases in eligibility are driven
by the Hispanics and white students, which were the two groups benefiting most from the
decoupling of Medicaid from AFDC. In the CPS samples analyzed, the average Hispanic lived in
a state where the generosity of the program increased more than threefold: from 20.7% of all
early childhood years coverable in 1994 to 67.4% eligible in 2010. Though not nearly as high in
magnitude, whites also experienced a near tripling of eligibility, going from 10.8% in 1994 to
32.1% in 2010.
As discussed in the last section, blacks, Hispanics, and whites all experienced large gains
in high school completion rates over the period analyzed. This fact is confirmed by the trends
shown in aggregated CPS Dropout Rates and the CCD Graduation Rates.26 However, since the

26

One limitation of the CCD data is that states did not always provide complete information on diplomas awarded.
For example, two states failed to report diploma counts for all students in 2004, while 3 did not report in 2006. This
issue becomes more serious when examining the trends in graduation rates by race and ethnic group, where the
earlier period experiences greater frequencies of non-reporting. Here, the maximum number of potential
observations is 14 * 51 * 3 = 2142, while only 1875 observations have valid data. A similar issue exists in the CPS
data which stems from the lack of a sufficient sample of 18 to 20 year olds to calculate dropout rates for blacks and
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completion measures and simulated Medicaid eligibility estimates are both increasing over the
period examined, it is important to use a variety of econometric techniques to de-trend the data to
avoid attributing an effect to the Medicaid expansions when some other third factor is truly
driving part of the relationship.

7.

Empirical Models: High School Dropouts
To explicate findings from my empirical models, I start with the full analysis of the high

school dropout rate, which constitutes the most consistent and robust finding of a causal link
between child Medicaid expansions and long-term gains in high school completion rates. After
dropouts, I discuss the modeling of four-year high school graduation rates, which can address
whether gains in completion rates were driven by increases in traditional diplomas or by other,
less valuable, forms of high school completion.

7.1.

Core Modeling
Table 3 contains estimates of the impact of Medicaid expansions in early childhood on

the subsequent high school dropout rates, which constitute the core modeling in this analysis.
Model 1 estimates the functional form proposed in equation 1 above. The three other models are
shown in this table are extensions of this base form: Model 2 adds state-race fixed effects, while
Models 3 and 4 account for existing trends in state-level graduation rates by exploiting statespecific time trends and state-cohort fixed effects, respectively. All standard errors in estimation
are clustered at the state-level to account for the fact that the state-level residuals are probably

Hispanics in select states in particular years. In both cases, the length of the panel examined should still facilitate
reliable estimates from the unbalanced panel.
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not independent and identically distributed even after conditioning on the other right-hand-side
variables.
Starting with the baseline presented in Model 1, there is a negative and statistically
significant relationship between Medicaid eligibility expansions during early childhood and the
dropout rate. However, it is easily argued that estimates from Model 1 suffer from omitted
variable bias, forms of which are addressed in the other three models. Adding the state-race fixed
effects in Model 2 increases the size of the estimated coefficient of interest, as well as decreases
the standard error. Once accounting for state-specific time trends in high school completion in
Model 3, the statistical precision of the estimate increases even further. The point estimate of 0.2422 can be interpreted as follows: a 10 percentage point increase in the Medicaid generosity
of a state-level program resulted in an approximately 2.4 pp decrease in high school dropout
rates, holding all other factors constant. Moreover, using state-cohort fixed effects to account for
even more of the unexplained variation in factors affecting graduation within a given state, the
point estimate increases slightly to 2.5 pp. This last finding strongly suggests that the groups
benefitting the most from the Medicaid expansions (e.g., Hispanics and whites) also experience
the greatest decreases in the dropout rates because identification now rests upon deviations from
the mean within a particular state and cohort.
Summarizing the findings from these models, estimates from the core modeling – which
are all estimated with a high level of statistical precision – indicate that Medicaid eligibility
expansions led to long-term decreases in the high school dropout rates, with estimates ranging
from 1.9 to 2.5 pp for each 10 pp increase in the generosity of the state’s Medicaid program.
Extending this estimate to the roughly 25 percentage point increase in program generosity
generally witnessed by all states during the expansion period reveals a decrease in the dropout
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rate of between 4.75 to 6.25 pp. Thus, relative to a dropout baseline of roughly 14% in 1994, this
indicates a decline of at least one third in the dropout rate, which can be attributed to Medicaid
expansions. These estimates are both large and economically meaningful.

7.2.

Heterogeneity Tests
Findings from the core empirical models and the Medicaid eligibility graphs suggest that

racial and ethnic groups may be differentially impacted by the magnitude of Medicaid
expansions, because each group starts with different levels of Medicaid access.27 Table 4
presents formal tests of this proposition by showing the results from group-specific modeling. As
the reader may quickly note, the power of the regressions are significantly diminished in the nonpooled models because the number of observations decline by 2/3. However, modeling presented
– which corresponds to the first two functional forms in Table 2 – confirms intuition: decreases
in dropout rates are greatest for Hispanics, who benefit the most from Medicaid eligibility
expansions. Blacks gain the least in terms of their completion rates. Whites reside somewhere in
the middle, as with eligibility gains, while the large standard errors on the point estimates
preclude the reporting of a statistically significant relationship at conventional levels. Moving
past the smaller sample and power issues, there are two other reasons why whites could gain
from access to public health insurance despite this finding in the disaggregated modeling. To
start, the additional fixed effects in the pooled modeling increase the precision of the estimates,
yet this important source of variation cannot be identified within the single group model.28

27

This is shown most noticeably by the trends in Medicaid eligibility expansions by group (Figure 2) and from the
models with state-cohort fixed effects (Model 4) in Table 3.
28
To be clearer, the state-cohort fixed effects identify unobserved factors which are changing over time within the
same state. Examples would be per pupil spending or graduation requirements. This potentially important source of
bias cannot be accounted for in the single group modeling because there is only one observation per state and year.
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Moreover, since regressions are weighted by the relevant number of students, whites have a
disproportionate weight in pooled modeling. Thus, if the true impact on whites was zero, the
finding of a statistically significant result would not occur in the larger sample because results
are driven by the central tendency for whites. These facts, when coupled with the issues
previously established, indicate that whites also benefit significantly from the early childhood
public health insurance expansions.

7.3.

Alternative Measures of Medicaid Eligibility, Part I: Fixed Cohort Demographics
Given the consistency of coefficients presented in Table 3, concerns regarding estimation

bias from unobserved omitted variables should be mitigated. The second major issue is to test
whether choices and assumptions made while constructing the % of Early Childhood Years with
Medicaid Eligibility inadvertently drives the statistically significant relationship between
expansions in public health insurance and high school dropout rates. To meet this objective, I
examine eight alternative estimates of a state’s Medicaid program generosity during the early
childhood years, analyses which investigate whether CPS sample selection or length of potential
Medicaid exposure differentially impact the estimates presented thus far. To ensure that changes
in sample composition over time are not driving the findings, the first series of models examine
the impact of fixing CPS demographics to a single sample of individuals choosing their family
structure and income levels. The second set tests whether the duration of Medicaid exposure
during early childhood matters. Having established that the dropout results are driven by
Hispanics and whites, all of these robustness checks exclude black students.
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Table 5 contains estimates derived from fixing the sample to three distinct March CPS
years: 1975, 1980, and 1985.29 This set of analyses investigate whether the changing CPS sample
impacts the relationship between Medicaid generosity and dropout rates by fixing the cohort
demographics to a single CPS year and then using CPI adjustment factors to convert family
earnings into the nominal dollars required to determine eligibility for AFDC or child Medicaid
eligibility within a given state-year.30 By choosing different fixed samples, I can potentially
alleviate lingering concerns of strategic behavior by a subset of families who may choose their
income level in order to qualify for public assistance programs in a particular state and year.
Table 5 starts with the core modeling estimated with Hispanic and white students only.
Coefficients are larger than those presented in Table 3 because black students were driving the
coefficient towards zero. As shown across a variety of specifications, results from the fixed CPS
sample are consistent with the limited core modeling, although the point estimates are often
larger than what was previously reported for the more highly specified models. Excluding the
potentially biased estimates presented in Model 1, estimated impacts range from roughly a 1.7 to
4.0 pp decrease in the high school dropout rate for each 10 pp increase in the generosity of the
state’s Medicaid program.
While this methodology leads to larger estimates of the impact of Medicaid expansions, it
suffers from the primary criticism that the use of a CPI inflator tacitly contains an unreasonable
assumption, namely that wages – especially those for low-wage workers – rose exactly by the
amount of inflation in a given year. Adjusting income under this methodology understates
generosity during a high inflationary period – which corresponds to the baseline period – because

29

When interpreting this table, please note that each cell represents a separate regression model.
To inflate the fixed CPS year (e.g., 1975, 1980, or 1985) earnings to “contemporaneous” values, I use a composite
CPI index created from the CPI-U-X1 and CPI-U-RS series constructed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
30
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the CPI adjustment factor allocates more income to low-income families then they would have
reasonably earned given market constraints.31 Although limited, this approach lends support to
the finding of an impact of public health insurance expansions during early childhood on the
subsequent long-term completion rates; it indicates that the use of the contemporaneous CPS
sample during early childhood is not arbitrarily driving the finding of a statistically significant
relationship between Medicaid eligibility expansions and fewer high school dropouts. Fixing the
demographics to a single year, if anything, would lead to larger estimates.

7.4.

Alternative Measures, Part II: Tests of the Potential Exposure to Medicaid
The remaining five alternative definitions of Medicaid eligibility test what happens when

the dose of Medicaid treatment is altered statistically or, in other words, as the cumulative
duration of Medicaid eligibility “received” changes. Since it is theoretically unclear how much
Medicaid exposure is required to produce an effect, I examine point estimates when eligibility is
estimated (1) as the lower bound of coverage, which is defined as the minimum percentage of the
cohort covered in any single year, (2) as the upper bound of coverage, which is the maximum
percentage of the cohort covered in any single year of early childhood, (3) during the conception
year only (e.g., prenatal care and birth), (4) from conception through age 2 in the traditional
manner, and finally, (5) coverage from age 3 to age 5, also with the core methodology
established earlier.
The latter cases are relatively straightforward in their construction and interpretation: by
examining a subset of ages potentially covered during early childhood – conception year only,

31

Inflation rates in the late 1970s and early 1980s often exceeded 10% in a single year and were above 5% in a
number of other years in this analysis. To maintain the assumption required by use of the fixed sample from either
1975, 1980, or 1985, low-skilled wages would also need to rise by the same amount. This assumption is implausible
given sticky wages and minimum wage regulations.
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from conception through age 2 and from age 3 to age 5 – I examine whether eligibility in the
earlier years is more important than eligibility in the latter ones. As other measures of the
duration of Medicaid eligibility, I also estimate the lower- and upper-bound of any potential
Medicaid coverage, which technically envelop the % of Early Childhood Years with Medicaid
Eligibility variable, which has been the focal point of this entire analysis.32 The lower-bound of
any coverage is defined by the minimum percentage of the estimated eligibility for any single
year of early childhood and seeks to proxy the maximum number of children within a statecohort which could have received treatment throughout the 7 years of early childhood. The
second measure – the upper-bound of any coverage – attempts to measure the maximum number
of children within a state-cohort who could have ever qualified for coverage during their
childhood, at any time.
The second series of findings in Table 6 contain estimates from the lower-bound of the
estimated Medicaid eligibility percentage in any single year, which again, seeks to proxy the
maximum number of children which could have received benefits in all seven years. This
measure of the cohort “always covered” during early childhood produces statistics estimated
with a high degree of statistical precision and which substantiate estimates presented in other
sections. The models report impacts on high school dropout rates ranging from 1.8 to 2.3 pp for
each 10 pp increase in Medicaid program generosity. Combined with the findings from the third
estimation exercise – which is a proxy for the maximum percentage of the state-cohort ever

32

A numerical example should help clarify the calculation of the lower- and upper-bounds. As provided in the
appendix, the estimated percent of early childhood years with Medicaid eligibility for all students in the graduating
class of 1997 in Alabama was 10.9%. This number is constructed as the simple average of the simulated eligibility
for the seven years from conception through age 5 or the CPS simulated estimates of 10.7%, 10.5%, 10.5%, 10.0%,
9.5%, 10.0%, and 15.2%, respectively. To estimate the lower-bound of coverage in any single year for a cohort, one
simply takes the smallest value from the seven years; here it is 9.5%. To estimate the upper-bound of coverage, one
uses the maximum number of CPS respondents covered in any single early childhood year, which is 15.2%. These
are the lower- and upper-bounds of potential coverage because they envelop the simple average of all seven years
which is used in the main modeling.
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potentially qualifying for Medicaid insurance – it appears that qualifying for Medicaid benefits at
some point during early childhood leads to the health and cognitive development benefits
outlined earlier. That stated, there is some evidence that there may be less of an impact as
expansions reached the upper tail of the low-income distribution as indicated by the smaller and
less precise estimates derived from the upper-bound exercise, especially in Models 1 through 3.
Finally, when potential eligibility is examined in the conception year only, from
conception through age 2, and from age 3 to age 5, coefficients are essentially in line with the
point estimates of 1.9 pp to 2.5 pp derived from core modeling. Given these findings, it does not
appear that any of the periods differentially impact high school graduation rates, i.e., the choice
of equal weighting to each of the early childhood years does not appear to be consequential.
Thus, while the methodology presented in this paper cannot precisely identify exactly which
early childhood period is most crucial – if there really is such a period – the link between
eligibility expansions from conception through age 5 and the long-term dropout rates is strong
and robust to a number of alternative estimation procedures.

8.

Empirical Models: Traditional Four-Year Graduation Rates
Given the consistency and robustness of findings across the various models examining

dropout rates, this section examines whether fewer high school dropouts translated into more
traditional high school graduates. As noted, holders of non-traditional diplomas do not fare better
in the labor market than high school dropouts. Thus, to have a real influence on the human
capital accumulation of low-income children, Medicaid must alter the number of traditional
diplomas instead of other vehicles to graduation, such as the GED.
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Table 7 presents a simplified version of the core modeling outlined in Table 3. While not
nearly as precise as the dropout modeling, coefficients on the Medicaid generosity variable
indicate a significant and robust relationship between increases in the percentage of early
childhood years with Medicaid eligibility and the long-term traditional high school graduation
rate. Estimates from modeling with black, Hispanic, and white students range from a 1.0 to 1.3
pp increase in completion rates stemming from a 10 pp increase in state program generosity.
Again, extending these point estimates to the over 25 pp increase in eligibility in the average
state, this suggests an increase in the four-year graduation rates of between 2.5 to 3.25 pp which
can be attributed to Medicaid expansions.
Findings for Hispanic and white students only are very similar to the coefficients reported
for the three race/ethnic groups. Though similar in magnitude to the other point estimates, Model
4 coefficients under both specifications are no longer statistically distinguishable from zero. This
fact indicates that the greatest beneficiaries of the Medicaid expansions – Hispanics – may not be
experiencing the largest gains in four-year graduation rates. While contrary to the other findings,
this is a reminder of one of limitations of the CCD data: one cannot exclude students likely to
have been ineligible for the large increases in access to public healthcare during early childhood.
Thus, to the extent to which graduation rates are diluted by recent immigrants for a particular
group – which they almost certainly are for Hispanics – then the estimates presented serve as a
lower-bound of the true impact. Consequently, it does not seem unreasonable to conclude that
the gains in the decreased dropout rates translated into more traditional diplomas and that
Hispanics and whites propel this finding.
The same set of robustness checks examined with the dropout models can be applied for
the four-year graduation rates. For the sake of brevity, they are not presented in this paper. In
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general, coefficients are similar to those presented in Table 7, though estimates can be less
statistically significant. This precision issue highlights another advantage of the CPS dropout rate
measure: it has a much longer time series at baseline, as it starts in 1994 as opposed to 1997.
Recalling Figure 3, this extended period is important to establish a baseline of Medicaid program
generosity within a state before the large scale public insurance expansions.

9.

Discussion and Conclusions
Seeking to examine the long-term impact of early childhood investments by the U.S.

government in the form of increased healthcare access to low-income children before they enter
primary school, this paper presents evidence that the Medicaid expansions to qualifying children
throughout the 1980s and early 1990s led to an increase in the high school completion rates in
the 2000s. By exploiting the large degree of heterogeneity in policy implementation of the public
insurance expansion mandates, as well as econometric techniques to account for otherwise
unobserved factors which cause certain states or race/ethnic groups to have differential trends in
graduation, I find a positive, consistent, and statistically significant relationship between
Medicaid eligibility expansions during early childhood and longer-term high school completion
rates.
The results presented in this paper are economically significant. For dropouts, the 1.9 to
2.5 pp decline in dropout rates for each 10 pp increase in public insurance program generosity
translates into approximately a 4.75 to 6.25 pp decline in overall dropout rates from 1994 to
2010. Relative to the estimated 14.4% dropout rate for all students in 1994, this suggests a 33 to
43% decrease in the number of students exiting high school without a diploma or equivalent
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degree. Furthermore, dropout impacts appear to be driven by Hispanic and white students, the
two groups benefiting the most from increased within-group access to public health insurance.
To test whether these gains impacted traditional manners of high school graduation, and
not imperfect substitutes such as the GED, I also examined four-year graduation rates using
traditional diploma counts from the Common Core of Data. The intent-to-treat estimates of a 1.0
to 1.3 percentage point increase in four-year graduation rates for each 10 pp increase in childyears potentially covered by a state’s Medicaid program implies that – on a base of roughly a 25
pp increase for the average state – there were 95,000 to 124,000 more graduates across the U.S.
in 2010 due to public health insurance expansions and healthier low-income children. Moreover,
improvements appear to be shared by all race and ethnic groups. This exercise confirms that
gains from public healthcare access did not stem from non-traditional means of high school
completion, which further indicate that these advances represent real improvements in long-term
human capital accumulation for a potentially vulnerable population.
This paper corroborates findings from two other recent working papers in the literature
which find substantial positive impacts on educational attainment and labor market outcomes
stemming from the child Medicaid expansions of the late 1980s and early 1990s (Brown et al.,
2014; Cohodes et al., 2014). In particular, it complements and extends Cohodes et al. (2014) by
more precisely targeting the source of the completion rate gains (Hispanic and whites), as well as
deriving more precise estimates of the effect by exploiting a longer data panel and other sources
of data. However, work in this arena is not without its current limitations. Important items left
for future research are to unpack the mechanisms prompting these positive effects and to better
understand when public insurance interventions matter the most. Stated another way, current
research has not identified what exactly facilitates these increases in performance. Is it from the
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general increase in child health, increases in cognitive and non-cognitive development before
entrance into primary school, the potential increase in seat-time for students who otherwise
would have been battling health issues in the absence of insurance, a more positive
predisposition towards academics, or other factors related to the benefits of health insurance,
including income effects? Furthermore, it is still unclear as to when public insurance matters the
most: is it in utero as claimed by those prescribing the fetal origins hypothesis, throughout early
childhood as supported by this paper, or throughout the entire childhood (e.g,. ages 0-17) as
analyzed by Cohodes et al.? Other datasets, sources, and methodologies are required to unravel
these mechanisms and to evaluate when these interventions have the greatest impacts.
Finally, there may be lingering concerns over the measures of completion explored in this
analysis. Presumably, arguments would be rooted in a measurement error critique, one which
would have to further assume non-classical error (since classical error on an outcome variable
simply leads to larger standard errors, but no bias in estimation). In the construction of 18-20
year old dropout rates, the smoothing technique would be problematic if it fails to adequately
account for some time-varying aspect of completion which is correlated with treatment (e.g.,
early childhood Medicaid expansions). While migration to other states after high school would
influence the general completion levels within a state, it is still not obvious how a source of
omitted variable bias would work under this scenario, especially given the other panel data
controls in the modeling.
Critiques of the four-year graduation rate could be more valid. Some race and ethnic
groups – such as black and Hispanics – may take longer, on average, to graduate from high
school than the standard of four years (Murnane, 2013). Consequently, these students would not
count as diploma holders in time period t (the numerator of the four-year graduation rate
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calculation) which is compared to the number of students enrolled in 8th grade at time period t-4
(the denominator). Like the dropout rates, this is not problematic so long as the marginal
propensity of completion remains constant over the time period examined, as this constant
measurement error is accounted for using the panel data techniques employed in this paper.
However, it would be a concern if these tendencies are time varying and occur simultaneously
with Medicaid expansions to low-income children. In other words, a biased coefficient results if
blacks or Hispanics in states with large Medicaid expansions are increasingly finishing within
four years and the sequence of these two events is highly correlated. Although it appears as
though this issue is ignored by those using the CCD in the academic literature because there is no
obvious solution – it would imply that the estimates derived in this analysis serve as an upperbound of the effect of Medicaid expansions. That stated, the robustness of the findings across the
two definitions of completion and the various constructs of Medicaid eligibility, concerns
regarding measurement error on the outcome variable should be abated.
To conclude, academic accountability studies, early childhood investments, and the
impact of Medicaid expansions have all received a considerable amount of attention in the
academic literature. This paper extends this work by examining how government investments in
the form of increased healthcare access in early childhood for low-income children impact
longer-term outcomes. Findings from this research reveal a large decline in dropout rates and a
complementary increase in the four-year completion rates. For the latter, the 2.5 to 3.25 pp
increase in the high school graduation rate stemming from the increases in healthcare access,
which explains the majority of the recent 6 pp increase in the U.S. graduation rates reported by
Murnane (2013). Policy implications of these findings are also meaningful given the high
correlation between education and outcomes deemed generally desirable to a society: as
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individuals become more educated they are less likely to become reliant upon governmental
programs as adults, less likely to engage in criminal activities, and more likely to be attached to
the labor market. Thus, it appears as though the Medicaid expansions to children throughout the
1980s and early 1990s generated social benefits well beyond “saving babies” and “free
healthcare” for qualifying low-income children during early childhood.
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Figure 1

Trends in CPS Children Aged 0 to 5 Residing in Two Parent Families: By Group
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Figure 2

U.S. Trends in Medicaid Eligibility Expansions by Group
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Figure 3

U.S. Trends in 18 to 20 Year Old Dropout Rate by Group
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Figure 4

U.S. Trends in the Four-Year Graduation Rate by Group
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Table 1

Linking the March CPS Samples with the Early Childhood Years for a Given Graduation Cohort
Graduation
Cohort

Conception

Age 0

Age 1

Age 2

Age 3

Age 4

Age 5

…

Age 18

1994

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

…

1994

1995

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

…

1995

1996

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

…

1996

1997

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

…

1997

1998

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

…

1998

1999

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

…

1999

2000

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

…

2000

2001

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

…

2001

2002

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

…

2002

2003

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

…

2003

2004

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

…

2004

2005

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

…

2005

2006

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

…

2006

2007

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

…

2007

2008

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

…

2008

2009

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

…

2009

2010

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

…

2010

Note: Each highlighted year corresponds to the March CPS used in estimation.
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Table 2

Completion Rates and Medicaid Expansions
Aggregated Analysis
CPS
Group
All
All
All
All
All
All
All
All
All
All
All
All
All
All
All
All
All
Black
Black
Black
Black
Black
Black
Black
Black
Black
Black
Black
Black
Black
Black
Black
Black
Black
Hispanic
Hispanic
Hispanic
Hispanic
Hispanic
Hispanic
Hispanic
Hispanic
Hispanic
Hispanic
Hispanic
Hispanic
Hispanic
Hispanic
Hispanic
Hispanic
Hispanic
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White

Graduation Cohort

Medicaid Eligibility

CPS Dropout Rate
(18 to 20
year olds)

1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010

15.1%
14.7%
14.3%
15.3%
16.7%
18.1%
19.4%
20.9%
22.8%
24.7%
27.5%
31.3%
33.9%
37.2%
39.6%
41.5%
42.2%
40.4%
39.8%
39.5%
39.9%
40.5%
41.5%
41.8%
44.0%
46.8%
49.3%
53.5%
58.8%
62.4%
66.8%
68.3%
69.6%
70.0%
20.7%
20.5%
21.3%
23.4%
26.5%
30.6%
34.5%
38.5%
42.7%
45.1%
49.0%
55.4%
57.7%
61.7%
64.5%
66.8%
67.4%
10.8%
10.4%
9.9%
10.6%
12.0%
13.1%
14.2%
15.1%
16.3%
17.8%
20.0%
23.0%
25.3%
28.0%
30.2%
31.8%
32.1%

14.4%
14.7%
14.0%
14.1%
14.1%
14.1%
13.5%
13.5%
12.0%
11.5%
11.7%
11.0%
10.9%
9.7%
9.3%
9.2%
8.8%
20.9%
19.2%
19.4%
19.7%
19.6%
18.8%
17.9%
17.6%
17.4%
14.9%
16.1%
15.0%
13.3%
13.5%
12.0%
13.0%
11.9%
23.8%
22.6%
24.3%
23.0%
24.7%
24.7%
22.7%
21.6%
18.6%
17.9%
18.6%
17.6%
17.5%
15.4%
13.9%
12.9%
11.5%
11.9%
12.8%
11.5%
11.6%
11.7%
11.6%
10.9%
11.3%
9.8%
9.9%
9.7%
9.1%
9.2%
7.8%
7.7%
7.6%
7.6%

CCD

States with Sufficient
Obs for Estimation
51
51
51
51
51
51
51
51
51
51
51
51
51
51
51
51
51
48
46
46
49
48
50
50
49
50
46
46
48
49
50
50
48
49
46
47
48
46
48
48
49
50
51
50
51
49
50
51
51
51
51
51
51
51
51
51
51
51
51
51
51
51
51
51
51
51
51
51

CCD Graduation
Rates

75.4%
75.1%
75.3%
76.1%
75.5%
76.8%
78.2%
79.0%
79.0%
77.6%
78.0%
78.8%
79.5%
82.3%

61.0%
61.6%
61.5%
63.0%
61.9%
63.3%
64.3%
66.3%
65.8%
64.7%
64.2%
66.5%
68.1%
71.3%

64.5%
66.2%
66.2%
66.4%
66.2%
68.6%
70.5%
72.8%
72.0%
68.4%
67.9%
69.4%
71.0%
77.6%

79.8%
79.7%
79.9%
81.0%
81.9%
80.6%
81.0%
81.5%
83.0%
82.5%
82.6%
83.1%
83.8%
85.0%

States Reporting
Graduates in CCD
0
0
0
51
51
51
51
51
51
51
49
51
48
51
51
51
51
0
0
0
43
43
46
45
46
46
49
47
49
45
48
50
51
51
0
0
0
43
43
46
45
46
46
49
47
49
45
48
50
51
51
0
0
0
43
43
46
45
46
46
49
47
49
45
48
50
51
51

Note: Aggregated Medicaid Eligibility and CPS Dropout Rates are weighted by the number of the relevant 18 to 20 year olds residing in a particular state in a given
year. CCD Graduation Rates are weighted by the relevant number of enrolled 8th graders for a given graduation cohort. Please see text for more detail.
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Table 3

Estimated Impact of Medicaid Expansions in Early Childhood on High School Completion Rates
Outcome Variable = 18 to 20 Year Old Dropout Rate using CPS Data
Range Analyzed: 1994 to 2010
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

-0.1727***

-0.1906***

-0.2422***

-0.2491***

[0.0441]

[0.0411]

[0.0498]

[0.0694]

0.1159***

0.2798***

0.2968***

0.2950***

[0.0160]

[0.0142]

[0.0175]

[0.0243]

Hispanic Students

0.1436***

0.1662***

0.1778***

0.1806***

[0.0146]

[0.0092]

[0.0113]

[0.0157]

Constant

0.1614***

0.1695***

0.2166***

0.2131***

[0.0045]

[0.0041]

[0.0049]

[0.0041]

2526
0.6308
0.6204

2526
0.6930
0.6710

2526
0.7180
0.6844

2526
0.7988
0.6735

X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X

% of Early Childhood Years with Medicaid Eligibility
Black Students

Number of obs.
R-Squared
Adjusted R-Squared
State Fixed-Effects
Cohort Fixed-Effects
State-Race Fixed Effects
State-Specific Time-Trends
State-Cohort Fixed Effects

X

Notes: Early childhood years are defined by the seven years from conception through age 5. Regressions are weighted by the number of relevant CPS individuals aged
18 to 20 residing within a particular state for a given year and ethnic group. Standard errors are clustered at the state-level and are in brackets with statistical significance
indicated as follows: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 4

Estimated Impact of Medicaid Expansions in Early Childhood on High School Completion Rates
Outcome Variable = 18 to 20 Year Old Dropout Rate using CPS Data
Response Heterogeneity - Models by Race/Ethnic Group
Black
Explanatory Variable

Hispanic

White

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

0.1641

-0.0279

-0.1141

-0.2797**

-0.1054

-0.1397

[0.1058]

[0.2135]

[0.1044]

[0.1356]

[0.0705]

[0.1237]

822

822

837

837

867

867

R-Squared

0.4826

0.5670

0.4896

0.5818

0.6919

0.7593

Adjusted R-Squared

0.4366

0.4564

0.4451

0.4774

0.6661

0.7018

State Fixed-Effects

X

X

X

X

X

X

Cohort Fixed-Effects

X

X

X

X

X

X

% of Early Childhood Years with Medicaid Eligibility

Number of obs.

State-Specific Time-Trends

X

X

X

Notes: Early childhood years are defined by the seven years from conception through age 5. Regressions are weighted by the number of relevant CPS individuals aged 18 to 20 residing
within a particular state for a given year and ethnic group. Standard errors are clustered at the state-level and are in brackets with statistical significance indicated as follows: * p<0.1, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 5

Alternative Dropout Estimates - Fixed Cohort Demographics
Hispanics and White Students Only
Medicaid Eligibility Definition
Limited Core Modeling

Demographics at CPS Year = 1975

Demographics at CPS Year = 1980

Demographics at CPS Year = 1985

Number of obs.
State Fixed-Effects
Cohort Fixed-Effects
State-Race Fixed Effects
State-Specific Time-Trends
State-Cohort Fixed Effects

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

-0.2083***

-0.2149***

-0.2579***

-0.2624***

[0.0401]

[0.0386]

[0.0498]

[0.0811]

-0.1680***

-0.1717***

-0.2943***

-0.3514**

[0.0604]

[0.0606]

[0.0671]

[0.1346]

-0.1930***

-0.2008***

-0.3370***

-0.3985***

[0.0684]

[0.0692]

[0.0746]

[0.1428]

-0.2014***

-0.2140***

-0.3348***

-0.3786**

[0.0618]

[0.0614]

[0.0818]

[0.1534]

1704

1704

1704

1704

X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

Notes: Early childhood years are defined by the seven years from conception through age 5. Regressions are weighted by the number of relevant CPS individuals aged
18 to 20 residing within a particular state for a given year and ethnic group. Standard errors are clustered at the state-level and are in brackets with statistical significance
indicated as follows: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 6

Alternative Dropout Estimates - Tests of the Potential Exposure to Medicaid Insurance
Hispanic and White Students Only
Medicaid Eligibility Definition

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

-0.2083***

-0.2149***

-0.2579***

-0.2624***

[0.0401]

[0.0386]

[0.0498]

[0.0811]

Lower Bound of Any Coverage: Minimum % in any single year
(from conception through age 5)

-0.1759***

-0.1820***

-0.1834***

-0.2320***

[0.0320]

[0.0310]

[0.0421]

[0.0626]

Upper Bound of Any Coverage: Maximum % in any single year
(from conception through age 5)

-0.0972**

-0.0974**

-0.0982**

-0.2208**

[0.0375]

[0.0368]

[0.0420]

[0.0906]

-0.1560***

-0.1620***

-0.1760***

-0.2400***

[0.0318]

[0.0305]

[0.0380]

[0.0657]

-0.2036***

-0.2113***

-0.2528***

-0.2551***

[0.0331]

[0.0314]

[0.0445]

[0.0742]

-0.1364***

-0.1377***

-0.1711***

-0.2390***

[0.0461]

[0.0453]

[0.0490]

[0.0881]

1704

1704

1704

1704

X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X

Limited Core Modeling

Conception Only

From Conception Through Age 2

Age 3 to Age 5

Number of obs.
State Fixed-Effects
Cohort Fixed-Effects
State-Race Fixed Effects
State-Specific Time-Trends
State-Cohort Fixed Effects

X

Notes: Early childhood years are defined by the seven years from conception through age 5. Regressions are weighted by the number of relevant CPS individuals aged 18 to
20 residing within a particular state for a given year and ethnic group. Standard errors are clustered at the state-level and are in brackets with statistical significance indicated
as follows: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 7

Estimated Impact of Medicaid Expansions in Early Childhood on High School Completion Rates
Outcome Variable = Four-Year Graduation Rates using Diploma Counts from the Common Core of Data
Range Cohorts Analyzed: 1997 to 2010
Modeling with all Race/Ethnic Groups

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

% of Early Childhood Years with Medicaid Eligibility

0.1061**

0.1294***

0.1004**

0.1203

[0.0467]

[0.0464]

[0.0478]

[0.0971]

1875
0.3052
0.2798

1875
0.3387
0.2744

1875
0.3525
0.2453

1875
0.4288
0.0668

Modeling with Hispanic and Whites Only

Model 1a

Model 2a

Model 3a

Model 4a

% of Early Childhood Years with Medicaid Eligibility

0.1218***

0.1371***

0.0865**

0.1111

[0.0413]

[0.0439]

[0.0404]

[0.1129]

1250
0.2101
0.1667

1250
0.2294
0.1512

1250
0.2409
0.0831

1250
0.7572
0.4708

X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X

Number of obs.
R-Squared
Adjusted R-Squared

Number of obs.
R-Squared
Adjusted R-Squared
State Fixed-Effects
Cohort Fixed-Effects
State-Race Fixed Effects
State-Specific Time-Trends
State-Cohort Fixed Effects

X

Notes: Early childhood years are defined by the seven years from conception through age 5. Regressions are weighted by the number of enrolled 8th graders for a given
graduation cohort residing within a particular state for a given year and ethnic group. Standard errors are clustered at the state-level and are in brackets with statistical
significance indicated as follows: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Appendix A

Summary of Key Benchmarks in Medicaid Expansions to Low-Income Children
affecting the Graduation Cohorts from the Class of 1997 to the Class of 2010
Year

Development

1965

The Medicaid and Medicare programs are signed into law in June and established as a volunteer federal-state partnership
in which participating states receive grants to cover mandatory populations (e.g. AFDC recipients) and services.

1967

Social Security Amendments mandate Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnostic, and Treatment (EPSDT) services for all
children up to age 21.

1972

Excluding Arizona, all states have established Medicaid programs.

1981

Despite the Reagan Administration's failure to convert Medicaid to a block grant, the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of
1981 (OBRA81) decreases federal matching payments. This affects fiscal years 1982 to 1984 and leads to coverage
decreases in some states for single mothers pregnant for the first time.

1982

Arizona becomes the last state to establish a Medicaid program.

1984

The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (DEFRA84) affects coverage to children under two mechanisms. First, coverage for
children born after September 20, 1983 is mandated for qualifying AFDC families, up through age 5. Secondly,
Medicaid coverage for first-time pregnant women eligible for AFDC and pregnant women in two-parent unemployed
families becomes mandatory. These policies take effect in 1985 and essentially eliminate the family structure restriction
on Medicaid receipt for all pregnant women.

1985

Under the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA85), coverage for all remaining AFDC
eligible pregnant women is now mandatory. Moreover, this act extended DEFRA84 coverage for children up through age
5, effective immediately.

1986

Under the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1986 (OBRA86), the federal government allows states to cover pregnant
women and infants (up to age 1) up to 100 percent of the federal poverty line (FPL). As another Medicaid option,
insurance coverage for children up to age 5 is expanded to 100% of the FPL which can be phased in over time.

1987

The Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1987 allowed states to again expand medical coverage to pregnant women and
infants (up to age 1) for families with incomes up to 185 percent of the federal poverty line.

1988

The Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988 (MCCA88) mandates that states begin phasing in coverage for
pregnant women and infants from families with income levels equal to or below 100% of the federal poverty line.

1989

The Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1989 (OBRA89) further mandated coverage for pregnant women and children under
the age of 6 in families with income at or below 133 percent of the federal poverty line, regardless of whether they also
were receiving AFDC benefits . Moreover, it required coverage up to age 6 for children in families below 133% of the
FPL. This act effectively decoupled Medicaid for children from AFDC.
Additionally - and importantly - the federal government mandated that states must treat any issues identified during
EPSDT screening, even if these procedure were not traditionally covered under the state's Medicaid program.

Primary Sources:
Kaiser Family Foundation: http://kff.org/medicaid/timeline/medicaid-a-timeline-of-key-developments/
U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) Reports: http://gao.gov/products/HRD-91-78
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Appendix B - Technical Details
Medicaid Eligibility Simulation
Before the decoupling of child Medicaid and AFDC, the primary basis for Medicaid qualification was AFDC
receipt. Given this, Medicaid eligibility determination in the early period is straightforward: only children in singleparent households qualified for care if their family income – less certain disregards – fell below the state’s payment
standards. As noted, these mandated thresholds varied greatly across states. During this early period, some states
did make allowances for children in two parent households with an unemployed parent (AFDC-UP), as well as for
“Ribicoff children” which, in this case, were typically teens who would have qualified for AFDC under their own
income thresholds but did not qualify in the traditional manner due to family structure issues (e.g. they still lived
with their parents). Archived documents outlined reveal states participating in these programs.
Another wrinkle in estimation during this early period was whether an unborn child counted in AFDC
determination. Before DEFRA 1984, which mandated coverage of the unborn, states differed greatly in their
positions especially when considering a single mother pregnant for the first time. When the unborn child did not
count, these mothers typically failed to receive coverage during their pregnancy because single individuals without
dependents rarely qualified for benefits. Preceding the federal mandate, a number of states incorporated programs to
support single mothers pregnant for the first time at the point of verification by medical professionals. Again, there
was wide variation in the implementation of these programs. All of these changes were documented and
incorporated into the simulation procedure.
Finally, the last step in the collection of legislative procedures was to acquire all of the effective dates and poverty
thresholds for the state Medicaid expansions to pregnant women, infants, and children in the late 1980s and early
1990s which effectively decoupled child Medicaid from AFDC. Documents outlining these transitions are
obtainable through the variety of resources (see list in the data section). These documents, in turn, can then be used
to compile a database of Medicaid eligibility requirements by state and year for young children in all states from
1975 to 1997.
Tables below disclose how specific rules governing qualification for either AFDC or Medicaid were handled in
the simulation:
Issue: In the early period, AFDC receipt is the general basis for Medicaid receipt
Category

Definition of a
family unit

Sub-Category

Details

Source(s)

General issues

The CPS contained detailed information intra-family
relationships. Thus, it is typically possible to link the
child to their parent(s), which can then be used in
March Current
establishing the size of the family unit applicable for
Population Survey
AFDC eligibility. To mitigate the issue of the
(various years)
endogeneity of family size due to social welfare
policies, families with either 1, 2, or 3 children are used
in simulations.

Before DEFRA 1984 - and effective in 1985 - a limited
number of states counted the unborn child as part of the
family unit in the determination of AFDC eligibility.
Unborn children
Thus, the family size would be smaller by one for
pregnant women in states not counting unborn children.
This applies to the conception year only.
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Analysis of State
Medicaid Program
Characteristics (various
years)

Before OBRA 1981: although there were no
standardized allowances before 1981, Currie and Gruber
assume that the levels were the same as those mandated
under OBRA 1981.
OBRA 1981: starting in October 1981, the standardized
allowances per month for work expenses was $75, while
states allowed up to $160 per month per child for child
care.
Earnings
Allowances

Income
requirements

Currie and Gruber
Family Support Act of 1988: effective October 1989,
(1994)
allowances were increased to $90 per month for work
expenses and $175 dollars per child per month for child
care.
30 and One-Third: at its inception, this work incentive
feature allowed families to keep the first $30 of earned
income, 1/3 of the remainder, while the remaining 2/3
lead directly to a reduction in AFDC benefits. See
Currie and Gruber for details regarding the evolution of
this program.

Binding
Constraint for
Qualification

Since the vast majority of the state's payment standards
were well below the needs standards, the binding
constraint for AFDC qualification was that a family
unit's gross earnings - minus earnings allowances
outlined in Currie and Gruber (1994) - were less than or
equal to the state's payment standard.

Historical payment
standards were available
through state-level data
provided by the
University of Kentucky
Center for Poverty
Research.

Issue: As Medicaid becomes delinked from AFDC, other groups become eligible for coverage
Category

Sub-Category

Details

Source(s)

DEFRA 1984

Medicaid coverage is mandated for children in AFDC
qualifying families born after September 20, 1983
through age 5

Kaiser Family
Foundation

COBRA 1985

All pregnant women who meet income requirements
were now eligible for Medicaid, regardless of family
structure or the presence of other children. DEFRA
coverage for children is expanded for all children at or
below the age of 5 residing in AFDC families.

General
expansions for
all women,
OBRA 1986
infants, and
children.

OBRA 1987

States were given the option to expand the income
thresholds for Medicaid eligibility regardless of family
structure type. As an option, states are allowed to
expand coverage to children up to age 5 residing in
families at or below 100% of the federal poverty line.

Currie and Gruber
(1994)
Kaiser Family
Foundation

Hill (1992);

The National Governors
States were allowed to increase the income thresholds Association MCH
up to 185% of the poverty line for pregnant women and Updates (various years);
infants.
Kaiser Family
Foundation
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Hill (1992);

children.

The National Governors
Association MCH
Updates (various years);

OBRA 1988

Kaiser Family
States were mandated to cover pregnant women, infants, Foundation
and children up to 133% of the poverty line by April
1990, again regardless of family structure type. Some
states choose thresholds above this mandated minimum.

DEFRA 1984 mandated coverage for all pregnant
Single mothers Unborn children
women qualifying for AFDC under the typical
pregnant for the and benefits
mechanisms, regardless of whether she already had
first time
qualification
children. This policy became effective in 1985.

Currie and Gruber
(1994)

Programs for
married women
DEFRA 1984
below income
requirements

Analysis of State
Medicaid Program
Characteristics (various
years)

Coverage of all pregnant women in AFDC-UP type
families now required. Before this mandate, states
different in their timing and coverage of AFDC-UP type
families.

Minors

Since the goal was to estimate the number of child-years
potentially covered by Medicaid, pregnant teens were
considered as their own family unit and, consequently,
the child qualified based upon the teenage mother's
Ribicoff children
income (and not the larger family unit that they may
have resided in). This simplifying assumption was
Currie and Gruber
made because historical details regarding state-level
(1994)
Ribicoff programs is limited.

Other
categories

Lacking information on Medical expenditures at the
Medically needy household level, it is difficult to identify medically
program
needy families. Consequently, they were not
incorporated into the simulations.

18-20 Year Old Dropout Rate using Current Population Survey Data
Sharing the same underlying data - the CPS - simulated Medicaid eligibility and the 18 to 20 year old dropout rates
are estimated in a similar manner. Given the necessity of the smoothing technique already discussed, as well
limiting the CPS respondents to only those individuals born in the United States, the 18-20 year old Dropout Rate in
a single CPS month is calculated as:

where:

i represents a CPS observation for a relevant 18 to 20 year old;
No Degree, Not Enrolled identifies respondents who did not complete high school and are no
longer enrolled in school - this defines a dropout; and
CPS Weight are the person weights reported by the individual CPS survey.

Page 64 of 70

As noted in the primary text, dropout rates are estimated using monthly data from the Current Population Survey.
Thus, instead of only a single month, 12 distinct CPS samples actually feed into a single cohort calculation. Since
the traditional secondary school year usual ends around June, rates for a graduation cohort are estimated using the
July CPS of a particular year through the June CPS of the next. For example, the sample used to calculate dropout
rates for the class of 2000 are taken from the July 2000 CPS through the June 2001 CPS. These twelve individuals
samples, along with the estimation using 18 to 20 year olds, ensures that a sufficient sample size produces the most
reliable statistics.

Four-Year Graduation Rates using the Common Core of Data
Although it is one of the best measure currently available to researchers, this choice of four-year graduation rate
using CCD data is not an uncontroversial because of two possible sources of measurement error. Before proceeding
to the issues associated with the four-year graduation rate measure, it is useful to first discuss how a perfect measure
would be constructed and then reveal how the four-year graduation rate potentially falls short. In an ideal thought
experiment, all students would (1) enter 9th grade at the same age and (2) never repeat grades but simply drop out in
a readily identifiable manner. Under this scenario and with accurate administrative data, once could construct a
graduation rate measure for state (s) at time (t) as:

Unfortunately, the two conditions listed above are not met in practice. Estimation of high school graduation rates
can be surprisingly challenging, due largely in part to some students taking longer than the standard of 4 years to
finish their diploma – an issue of degree duration – and because other students remain in administrative systems
longer than 4 years but never finish their degrees – a matter of grade retention. To simplify these issues, I follow
Heckman and LaFontaine (2010) in their calculation of the four-year graduation rate.
While issues associated with degree duration are discussed in detail in the primary text, the second form of
measurement error, grade retention , invokes less controversial assumptions. Importantly, it also relates to how a
graduation cohort is determined in this analysis. Returning to the ideal equation above, calculation of a graduation
rate takes some measure of completion as the numerator and some baseline measure of potential graduates as the
denominator. While the exclusion of GED holders from the high school graduation calculation is simple –
essentially one just subtracts these individuals from the numerator – the definition of the denominator is more
challenging, given the problem of grade retention and the definition of a cohort. Since students who are held back in
high school are much more likely to drop out, it is important to properly control for these individuals across cohorts
so that they are not counted multiple times.[1]
To avoid the problems associated with grade retention, Warren (2005) proposed that the number of enrolled
Grade 8 students be used as a proxy for the number of incoming Grade 9 students for a particular graduation
cohort,[2] an approach was later employed by Heckman and LaFontaine (2010). I follow this approach in my
analysis. This implies that the cohort is defined by the year in which they graduate and not some other measure,
such as the year they enter 9 th grade .[3] With the lag structure required to estimate the graduation rate under this
process, the first cohort for which a graduation rate can be estimated using the CCD data is the class of 1997.
Conveniently, this covers a minimal pre-period before the rules governing child Medicaid coverage were
significantly expanded in all states, which means that I can establish a baseline of graduation rates before estimating
the impacts of the marked increases in Medicaid eligibility during early childhood. Moreover, trends and estimates
are consistent with those presented by Heckman and LaFontaine (2010).
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Section Endnotes:
[1] As outlined by Warren (2005), a flawed estimation methodology using CCD data is to simply take the number
of graduating seniors at time t and to divide by the number of freshman reported at time t-3. The problem with this
approach is that students can stay registered in Grade 9 when they remain in the system, attend school sparingly,
and do not progress past Grade 9; this is true especially with the end of social promotion policies. Thus, including
these individuals in the Grade 9 calculation could lead to the double-counting of select individuals and a dilution
of the graduation rate.
[2] Under this assumption, graduation rates are calculated as the number of high school graduates at time t divided
by the number of 8th graders enrolled at time t-4, an estimation strategy which can reduce the bias from repeating
students.
[3] Thus, for example, students graduating in 2010 are referred to as the class of 2010 even though some
individuals may have originally had other anticipated graduation years (e.g. the class of 2009 for those repeating
one year).
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Appendix - Table C1
Estimated Percent of Early Childhood Years with Medicaid Eligibility
By Graduation Cohort - From Conception through Age 5
All Students
State

1994

Alabama

10.7% 10.4% 10.2% 10.9% 11.6% 12.3% 12.7% 13.3% 14.1% 17.5% 20.7% 24.8% 30.4% 34.2% 37.5% 38.6% 38.7%

1995

Alaska

12.7% 12.7% 12.9% 16.0% 20.0% 23.9% 27.2% 31.2% 34.8% 36.1% 37.3% 40.9% 41.6% 43.0% 44.0% 45.3% 45.3%
0.0%

1996

1.6%

1997

4.4%

1998

7.3%

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

Arizona

0.0%

Arkansas

10.6% 10.4% 10.2% 11.0% 11.9% 12.9% 13.6% 14.9% 17.8% 20.7% 26.7% 30.7% 33.8% 36.3% 37.5% 38.6% 38.7%

10.5% 13.4% 16.5% 20.3% 22.8% 27.1% 30.9% 33.4% 36.3% 37.7% 39.1% 39.4%

California

19.3% 19.1% 18.7% 20.2% 22.5% 24.8% 26.9% 29.0% 31.4% 32.4% 33.0% 35.8% 36.4% 39.0% 41.3% 43.4% 43.3%

Colorado

17.2% 16.7% 16.2% 17.0% 18.3% 19.4% 20.2% 21.3% 22.5% 24.5% 26.6% 29.8% 31.9% 34.5% 36.6% 38.6% 38.7%

Connecticut

18.7% 18.4% 18.0% 19.4% 21.6% 23.8% 25.6% 28.2% 30.4% 31.4% 32.2% 34.7% 37.6% 40.5% 44.8% 46.3% 47.8%

Delaware

16.8% 16.3% 15.5% 16.0% 16.8% 17.8% 18.5% 19.4% 20.6% 23.0% 27.7% 31.0% 33.4% 36.3% 38.3% 40.3% 41.8%

District of Columbia

17.4% 16.8% 16.1% 16.6% 17.8% 18.7% 19.7% 21.0% 22.5% 22.9% 28.1% 31.4% 33.5% 35.3% 38.1% 40.8% 43.3%

Florida

11.4% 11.2% 11.1% 12.3% 13.6% 14.9% 16.0% 17.3% 20.2% 22.7% 27.1% 30.5% 33.2% 36.8% 38.5% 40.1% 41.2%

Georgia

10.4% 10.4% 10.4% 11.4% 12.7% 13.9% 14.9% 16.4% 17.8% 20.4% 25.1% 29.0% 31.8% 34.9% 37.5% 38.6% 39.2%

Hawaii

20.2% 19.7% 18.9% 19.9% 21.4% 22.8% 23.9% 25.4% 27.4% 29.2% 31.1% 34.7% 37.0% 41.4% 45.1% 48.0% 52.3%

Idaho

12.7% 12.4% 12.3% 13.6% 15.0% 16.3% 17.4% 18.8% 20.1% 22.3% 25.1% 28.4% 31.2% 34.1% 36.6% 38.6% 38.7%

Illinois

16.9% 16.4% 15.8% 16.2% 17.2% 18.2% 19.0% 20.0% 21.1% 23.2% 26.0% 29.3% 32.6% 35.3% 37.5% 38.6% 38.7%

Indiana

11.4% 11.3% 11.2% 12.4% 13.8% 15.1% 16.1% 17.6% 18.9% 21.3% 24.3% 28.1% 30.6% 33.6% 36.1% 39.2% 39.7%

Iowa

17.8% 17.4% 16.7% 17.3% 18.5% 19.6% 20.4% 21.6% 22.8% 24.7% 27.1% 31.1% 34.5% 38.6% 42.2% 43.4% 43.3%

Kansas

18.5% 17.9% 17.1% 17.7% 18.9% 20.0% 21.0% 22.0% 23.6% 25.6% 27.5% 31.3% 33.2% 36.1% 38.5% 40.1% 40.2%

Kentucky

14.2% 13.3% 12.3% 12.5% 13.1% 13.8% 14.6% 15.8% 17.0% 19.6% 24.4% 30.0% 33.7% 37.0% 39.9% 41.8% 43.3%

Louisiana

11.1% 10.9% 10.8% 11.8% 13.0% 13.9% 14.8% 15.9% 18.7% 21.4% 24.6% 28.2% 31.2% 34.6% 37.5% 38.6% 38.7%

Maine

12.5% 12.9% 13.5% 15.2% 17.4% 19.5% 20.8% 22.4% 24.5% 26.4% 28.2% 31.9% 36.2% 40.0% 43.3% 43.4% 43.3%

Maryland

16.7% 16.3% 15.7% 16.4% 17.5% 18.5% 19.5% 20.7% 22.1% 24.3% 26.5% 31.5% 33.6% 39.3% 43.6% 47.7% 49.2%

Massachusetts

18.6% 18.2% 17.5% 18.2% 19.5% 20.9% 22.4% 24.0% 26.0% 27.8% 29.7% 32.8% 37.1% 40.5% 43.3% 43.4% 43.3%

Michigan

19.3% 18.8% 18.2% 19.1% 20.6% 22.3% 23.5% 25.2% 27.0% 28.5% 30.2% 35.7% 39.6% 43.0% 43.8% 44.3% 44.8%

Minnesota

19.2% 18.8% 18.2% 19.5% 21.6% 23.6% 25.1% 26.8% 28.6% 29.9% 30.7% 33.6% 41.1% 48.0% 54.7% 58.5% 60.8%

Mississippi

9.9%

Missouri

15.2% 15.0% 14.6% 15.1% 16.0% 16.8% 17.4% 18.4% 19.3% 21.7% 26.9% 30.7% 33.3% 36.3% 37.5% 38.6% 38.7%

9.7%

9.7%

10.2% 10.8% 11.4% 12.0% 12.9% 13.8% 16.9% 22.8% 29.0% 35.1% 40.5% 43.3% 43.4% 43.3%

Montana

15.9% 15.0% 14.1% 14.9% 16.2% 17.3% 18.8% 20.6% 22.3% 24.2% 26.7% 29.9% 31.9% 34.5% 36.6% 38.6% 38.7%

Nebraska

17.7% 17.4% 16.8% 17.6% 18.7% 19.7% 20.5% 21.5% 22.6% 24.6% 27.5% 30.7% 32.8% 35.4% 37.5% 38.6% 38.7%

Nevada

12.1% 11.9% 11.8% 12.8% 14.0% 15.4% 16.5% 18.1% 19.7% 22.2% 25.3% 28.7% 31.2% 34.1% 36.4% 38.6% 38.7%

New Hampshire

12.2% 12.0% 11.9% 13.4% 15.4% 17.2% 18.7% 21.0% 23.2% 25.2% 27.6% 31.2% 33.2% 36.6% 39.3% 42.2% 44.3%

New Jersey

17.7% 17.2% 16.5% 17.1% 18.5% 19.8% 20.7% 22.1% 23.4% 23.6% 26.0% 30.3% 32.9% 35.3% 36.5% 39.2% 41.7%

New Mexico

11.6% 11.5% 11.4% 12.7% 14.1% 15.3% 16.4% 17.7% 19.1% 21.5% 27.2% 30.6% 33.2% 36.3% 37.5% 41.6% 44.7%

New York

19.4% 18.9% 18.3% 19.5% 21.2% 23.0% 24.4% 26.1% 27.9% 28.3% 29.5% 32.5% 33.6% 37.9% 40.6% 43.4% 43.3%

North Carolina

11.0% 10.8% 10.7% 11.6% 12.8% 13.9% 14.9% 16.3% 17.6% 20.3% 26.8% 30.3% 33.1% 36.8% 39.6% 42.3% 43.3%

North Dakota

12.6% 12.4% 12.4% 14.0% 16.1% 17.9% 19.4% 21.1% 23.0% 24.8% 27.2% 30.3% 32.3% 34.7% 36.8% 38.6% 38.7%

Ohio

16.8% 16.3% 15.7% 16.2% 17.1% 18.0% 18.7% 19.7% 20.9% 23.2% 25.6% 28.9% 32.3% 35.2% 37.5% 38.6% 38.7%

Oklahoma

11.6% 11.5% 11.4% 12.7% 14.3% 15.9% 17.1% 18.7% 20.2% 22.5% 26.4% 31.2% 33.5% 36.3% 37.5% 38.6% 39.2%

Oregon

17.7% 16.6% 15.2% 15.9% 17.2% 18.3% 19.9% 21.8% 23.8% 25.6% 28.7% 31.8% 33.5% 35.8% 37.5% 38.6% 38.7%

Pennsylvania

18.3% 17.7% 16.9% 17.6% 18.8% 20.0% 21.0% 21.9% 23.2% 25.1% 28.4% 32.0% 33.9% 36.3% 37.5% 38.6% 40.1%

Rhode Island

18.7% 18.2% 17.7% 18.8% 20.7% 22.5% 24.0% 25.4% 27.5% 28.9% 30.4% 33.3% 37.2% 40.5% 46.6% 49.8% 52.9%

South Carolina

10.8% 10.5% 10.5% 11.3% 12.4% 13.4% 14.3% 15.2% 18.1% 21.0% 24.7% 29.9% 32.9% 37.8% 40.7% 43.4% 43.3%

South Dakota

12.8% 12.5% 12.4% 13.8% 15.4% 16.8% 18.1% 19.3% 20.9% 23.0% 25.7% 29.4% 32.7% 35.3% 37.5% 38.6% 38.7%

Tennessee

10.8% 10.5% 10.4% 11.0% 11.8% 12.7% 13.4% 14.4% 17.3% 20.4% 25.7% 29.4% 32.6% 36.8% 38.5% 41.2% 42.2%

Texas

10.1%

Utah

16.8% 15.8% 14.7% 15.4% 16.6% 17.7% 19.2% 20.9% 22.6% 24.5% 27.0% 30.1% 33.0% 35.5% 37.5% 38.6% 38.7%

9.8%

9.7%

10.5% 11.6% 12.6% 13.5% 14.7% 15.8% 18.8% 22.2% 28.1% 31.1% 34.6% 37.5% 40.2% 41.7%

Vermont

19.6% 19.3% 18.8% 20.1% 22.2% 24.3% 25.9% 27.2% 29.0% 30.2% 31.3% 34.0% 39.9% 45.5% 51.0% 53.5% 54.6%

Virginia

11.8% 11.7% 11.6% 12.9% 14.7% 16.3% 17.7% 19.5% 21.1% 23.2% 25.9% 29.6% 32.7% 35.3% 37.5% 38.6% 38.7%

Washington

17.8% 16.8% 15.6% 16.7% 18.5% 20.3% 22.2% 24.5% 26.7% 27.9% 29.7% 32.6% 33.8% 37.2% 42.3% 47.1% 49.0%

West Virginia

16.2% 15.6% 14.8% 15.1% 15.6% 16.3% 17.0% 17.5% 19.9% 22.5% 26.6% 30.6% 34.7% 38.3% 40.0% 40.1% 40.2%

Wisconsin

19.5% 19.0% 18.5% 19.9% 22.0% 24.1% 25.7% 27.3% 29.0% 30.0% 31.6% 35.0% 37.2% 39.4% 41.3% 43.2% 44.8%

Wyoming

12.6% 12.4% 12.4% 13.8% 15.4% 16.9% 18.2% 19.7% 21.2% 23.3% 26.1% 29.3% 32.6% 35.3% 37.5% 38.6% 38.7%

Page 67 of 70

Appendix - Table C2
Estimated Percent of Early Childhood Years with Medicaid Eligibility
By Graduation Cohort - From Conception through Age 5
Black Students
State

1994

Alabama

36.1% 35.2% 34.9% 35.1% 34.9% 35.1% 35.0% 35.7% 37.0% 41.8% 45.4% 51.5% 58.6% 63.8% 67.1% 67.9% 67.9%

1995

Alaska

40.6% 40.8% 41.2% 43.5% 47.1% 50.8% 53.4% 58.4% 62.5% 64.2% 65.4% 69.0% 70.1% 72.2% 72.5% 73.2% 73.3%
0.0%

1996

5.2%

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

Arizona

0.0%

Arkansas

35.8% 35.4% 35.0% 35.1% 35.5% 36.2% 36.3% 38.3% 41.9% 45.5% 53.3% 59.1% 63.3% 66.6% 67.1% 67.9% 67.9%

11.3% 17.9% 24.6% 30.8% 38.4% 45.5% 48.7% 53.7% 59.3% 62.7% 66.6% 67.1% 68.1% 68.3%

California

47.8% 47.4% 47.2% 48.0% 49.8% 51.7% 53.2% 55.9% 58.9% 60.2% 61.7% 64.9% 66.1% 68.9% 69.9% 71.0% 70.9%

Colorado

44.7% 43.7% 43.4% 43.8% 44.3% 45.0% 45.2% 47.0% 48.8% 51.0% 54.1% 58.1% 61.1% 64.6% 66.1% 67.9% 67.9%

Connecticut

46.1% 45.8% 45.5% 46.0% 47.9% 50.1% 51.3% 55.1% 57.8% 59.0% 60.8% 63.9% 67.1% 70.2% 72.9% 73.3% 74.6%

Delaware

44.1% 42.9% 42.2% 42.2% 42.5% 42.9% 43.0% 44.9% 46.8% 49.4% 55.1% 59.3% 62.7% 66.6% 67.6% 69.0% 70.0%

District of Columbia

45.1% 44.0% 43.3% 43.3% 43.6% 44.2% 44.7% 46.9% 49.1% 49.6% 56.1% 60.1% 63.2% 65.7% 67.2% 69.1% 70.9%

Florida

38.0% 37.5% 37.4% 38.0% 38.7% 39.4% 39.9% 42.1% 45.8% 49.0% 54.3% 58.7% 62.5% 67.1% 67.9% 69.2% 69.7%

Georgia

35.4% 35.4% 35.4% 35.8% 36.9% 37.8% 38.4% 40.7% 42.7% 46.0% 51.3% 57.0% 60.9% 65.1% 67.1% 67.9% 68.3%

Hawaii

48.9% 48.1% 47.5% 47.9% 48.7% 49.8% 50.1% 52.4% 54.8% 56.8% 59.4% 63.4% 66.3% 70.7% 72.8% 74.8% 77.7%

Idaho

41.0% 40.4% 40.1% 40.8% 41.5% 42.0% 42.3% 44.4% 46.4% 49.1% 52.6% 56.7% 60.5% 64.3% 66.1% 67.9% 67.9%

Illinois

43.5% 42.9% 42.0% 41.8% 42.4% 43.3% 43.3% 45.2% 46.7% 49.1% 53.5% 57.6% 61.8% 65.4% 67.1% 67.9% 67.9%

Indiana

37.7% 37.6% 37.3% 37.7% 38.7% 39.5% 39.8% 42.2% 44.0% 46.9% 50.6% 56.1% 59.7% 63.8% 65.6% 68.3% 68.7%

Iowa

44.9% 44.4% 43.6% 43.5% 44.2% 44.9% 45.3% 47.4% 48.8% 50.9% 55.0% 59.8% 64.2% 68.4% 70.6% 71.0% 70.9%

Kansas

46.9% 45.8% 45.1% 45.1% 45.5% 45.9% 46.5% 48.2% 50.5% 52.7% 55.6% 60.1% 62.8% 66.4% 67.9% 69.2% 69.1%

Kentucky

40.1% 39.0% 38.0% 37.3% 37.6% 37.9% 38.0% 39.8% 41.6% 44.9% 50.6% 58.0% 63.0% 67.5% 68.9% 69.9% 70.9%

Louisiana

37.2% 36.6% 36.6% 37.1% 37.6% 38.1% 38.3% 40.0% 43.6% 47.0% 51.0% 55.6% 59.8% 64.4% 67.1% 67.9% 67.9%

Maine

38.7% 39.0% 39.5% 40.7% 42.6% 44.7% 45.6% 48.2% 50.7% 52.7% 55.5% 60.7% 65.6% 69.7% 71.6% 71.0% 70.9%

Maryland

44.0% 43.0% 42.6% 42.8% 43.3% 43.9% 44.3% 46.4% 48.5% 51.0% 54.0% 59.9% 63.0% 68.8% 71.5% 74.4% 75.7%

Massachusetts

46.9% 46.1% 45.5% 45.7% 46.3% 47.3% 48.2% 50.7% 53.1% 55.2% 57.9% 61.6% 66.5% 70.2% 71.6% 71.0% 70.9%

Michigan

47.8% 47.0% 46.5% 46.9% 47.5% 49.0% 49.6% 52.1% 54.4% 56.0% 58.5% 64.3% 68.5% 72.2% 72.2% 72.1% 72.4%

Minnesota

47.8% 47.1% 46.5% 47.3% 48.9% 50.5% 51.4% 53.9% 56.1% 57.6% 59.2% 62.6% 69.0% 75.0% 79.0% 81.1% 83.0%

Mississippi

33.6% 33.5% 33.2% 33.0% 32.9% 33.0% 33.2% 34.8% 36.3% 40.5% 48.1% 56.8% 64.0% 70.2% 71.6% 71.0% 70.9%

Missouri

40.9% 40.7% 40.4% 40.2% 40.8% 41.2% 41.3% 43.2% 44.6% 47.4% 53.5% 59.0% 62.7% 66.6% 67.1% 67.9% 67.9%

Montana

43.3% 42.2% 41.3% 41.8% 42.4% 43.1% 44.1% 46.7% 48.9% 51.2% 54.2% 58.3% 61.2% 64.7% 66.1% 67.9% 67.9%

Nebraska

45.6% 44.9% 44.3% 44.6% 44.8% 45.4% 45.6% 47.3% 49.0% 51.2% 55.0% 59.0% 62.0% 65.5% 67.1% 67.9% 67.9%

Nevada

39.6% 39.0% 38.8% 39.1% 39.6% 40.4% 40.9% 43.2% 45.5% 48.7% 52.5% 56.9% 60.5% 64.3% 66.0% 67.9% 67.9%

New Hampshire

39.5% 39.4% 39.1% 39.8% 41.3% 42.8% 43.8% 47.0% 49.4% 51.9% 54.9% 60.1% 62.9% 66.8% 68.5% 70.7% 72.5%

New Jersey

44.6% 44.1% 43.2% 43.2% 44.2% 45.1% 45.7% 47.9% 49.5% 49.8% 53.1% 59.0% 62.6% 65.7% 66.2% 68.2% 70.0%

New Mexico

38.7% 38.1% 38.1% 38.8% 39.5% 40.2% 40.7% 42.8% 44.7% 47.7% 54.4% 58.7% 62.5% 66.6% 67.1% 70.0% 72.4%

New York

48.0% 47.2% 46.7% 47.2% 48.2% 49.6% 50.5% 52.8% 55.2% 55.9% 58.1% 61.6% 63.3% 67.7% 69.1% 71.0% 70.9%

North Carolina

36.8% 36.6% 36.2% 36.4% 37.2% 38.1% 38.5% 40.7% 42.6% 45.9% 54.0% 58.5% 62.4% 67.1% 68.5% 70.4% 70.9%

North Dakota

40.9% 40.4% 40.4% 41.6% 42.8% 44.1% 45.0% 47.6% 49.8% 52.1% 55.1% 59.0% 61.9% 65.0% 66.3% 67.9% 67.9%

Ohio

44.2% 43.0% 42.5% 42.5% 42.8% 43.2% 43.3% 45.2% 47.1% 49.6% 53.1% 57.2% 61.6% 65.4% 67.1% 67.9% 67.9%

Oklahoma

38.2% 38.0% 37.9% 38.5% 39.7% 41.0% 41.5% 43.9% 45.9% 48.5% 53.2% 59.5% 62.8% 66.6% 67.1% 67.9% 68.3%

Oregon

46.2% 44.7% 43.5% 43.7% 44.3% 44.9% 45.7% 48.3% 50.7% 53.0% 56.7% 60.5% 63.1% 66.2% 67.1% 67.9% 67.9%

Pennsylvania

46.4% 45.4% 44.7% 44.9% 45.3% 45.9% 46.4% 47.6% 49.3% 51.4% 55.4% 60.7% 63.4% 66.6% 67.1% 67.9% 68.9%

Rhode Island

46.9% 46.1% 45.7% 46.3% 47.6% 49.2% 50.1% 52.4% 55.0% 56.6% 58.8% 62.3% 66.6% 70.2% 73.9% 75.7% 78.3%

South Carolina

36.5% 35.7% 35.6% 36.1% 36.8% 37.1% 37.5% 38.9% 42.5% 46.1% 51.2% 57.9% 62.0% 67.7% 69.1% 71.0% 70.9%

South Dakota

41.1% 40.6% 40.4% 41.2% 42.0% 42.7% 43.4% 44.8% 46.7% 49.3% 52.5% 57.9% 62.1% 65.6% 67.1% 67.9% 67.9%

Tennessee

36.3% 35.5% 35.3% 35.4% 35.4% 35.8% 35.9% 37.7% 41.6% 45.4% 52.2% 57.1% 61.6% 67.1% 67.9% 69.9% 70.4%

Texas

34.3% 33.9% 33.5% 33.7% 34.5% 35.5% 36.0% 37.9% 39.8% 43.6% 47.9% 55.5% 59.7% 64.4% 67.1% 69.0% 70.0%

Utah

45.0% 43.7% 42.7% 43.0% 43.4% 44.0% 44.8% 47.3% 49.3% 51.7% 54.8% 58.7% 62.5% 65.7% 67.1% 67.9% 67.9%

Vermont

48.3% 47.7% 47.4% 48.1% 49.7% 51.5% 52.4% 53.9% 55.8% 57.1% 59.9% 63.1% 68.3% 73.5% 77.1% 78.4% 79.6%

Virginia

38.6% 38.5% 38.2% 38.9% 40.2% 41.7% 42.4% 45.0% 46.9% 49.3% 52.6% 58.0% 62.0% 65.5% 67.1% 67.9% 67.9%

Washington

46.6% 45.4% 44.4% 45.0% 46.1% 47.6% 48.8% 51.6% 54.1% 55.7% 58.1% 61.6% 63.3% 67.0% 70.3% 74.0% 75.6%

West Virginia

43.4% 42.2% 41.5% 40.9% 40.8% 40.9% 41.0% 41.8% 44.7% 47.9% 53.0% 58.7% 64.0% 68.6% 69.5% 69.2% 69.1%

Wisconsin

48.1% 47.4% 47.1% 47.7% 49.3% 51.2% 52.0% 54.4% 56.4% 57.7% 59.9% 63.7% 66.5% 69.4% 70.6% 71.6% 73.0%

Wyoming

40.8% 40.4% 40.5% 41.3% 42.2% 43.2% 43.8% 46.0% 47.9% 50.5% 53.8% 57.9% 62.0% 65.5% 67.1% 67.9% 67.9%
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Appendix - Table C3
Estimated Percent of Early Childhood Years with Medicaid Eligibility
By Graduation Cohort - From Conception through Age 5
Hispanic Students
State

1994

Alabama

14.8% 14.6% 14.9% 16.6% 18.6% 20.6% 22.3% 23.9% 25.8% 31.0% 36.4% 43.1% 51.8% 57.5% 62.5% 63.7% 63.6%

1995

Alaska

16.7% 16.9% 17.7% 23.0% 30.1% 37.2% 43.4% 50.3% 56.9% 58.4% 60.7% 66.3% 66.9% 68.6% 69.5% 70.9% 70.9%
0.0%

1996

2.8%

1997

7.5%

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

Arizona

0.0%

Arkansas

14.8% 14.6% 14.9% 16.7% 19.1% 21.8% 23.9% 26.8% 32.5% 37.0% 47.1% 53.6% 57.7% 61.0% 62.5% 63.7% 63.6%

12.7% 18.7% 24.1% 29.9% 37.2% 41.1% 47.8% 54.0% 56.9% 61.0% 62.7% 64.2% 64.5%

California

27.0% 27.1% 27.7% 30.7% 35.2% 40.3% 45.0% 49.3% 54.1% 55.4% 56.1% 61.0% 61.2% 64.1% 66.6% 68.6% 68.4%

Colorado

24.9% 24.6% 24.7% 26.3% 29.2% 32.4% 35.1% 38.0% 41.2% 43.9% 47.0% 52.3% 54.8% 58.3% 60.9% 63.7% 63.6%

Connecticut

26.4% 26.3% 26.9% 29.7% 34.0% 39.1% 43.3% 48.3% 53.0% 54.4% 55.4% 59.7% 62.4% 65.5% 70.1% 71.6% 73.2%

Delaware

24.5% 24.1% 24.1% 25.1% 27.2% 30.1% 32.5% 35.0% 37.9% 41.4% 48.5% 54.1% 57.1% 61.0% 63.4% 65.5% 67.0%

District of Columbia

25.0% 24.6% 24.6% 25.7% 28.4% 31.4% 34.3% 37.4% 41.0% 41.8% 49.9% 55.3% 57.9% 59.9% 63.1% 65.8% 68.4%

Florida

15.6% 15.6% 15.9% 18.4% 21.8% 25.0% 27.9% 31.1% 36.7% 40.6% 47.4% 53.1% 56.6% 61.6% 63.7% 65.5% 66.4%

Georgia

14.6% 14.6% 15.1% 17.4% 20.3% 23.3% 26.0% 29.4% 32.6% 36.7% 44.3% 50.6% 54.4% 58.9% 62.5% 63.7% 64.3%

Hawaii

27.8% 27.4% 27.7% 30.0% 33.5% 37.5% 40.9% 44.4% 48.9% 51.5% 53.9% 59.5% 61.8% 66.4% 70.0% 72.8% 75.9%

Idaho

16.8% 16.9% 17.2% 20.0% 23.5% 27.0% 30.1% 33.2% 36.4% 39.7% 44.2% 49.9% 53.5% 57.6% 60.9% 63.7% 63.6%

Illinois

24.6% 24.1% 24.3% 25.4% 27.7% 30.7% 33.1% 36.0% 38.9% 41.9% 45.9% 51.5% 55.9% 59.6% 62.5% 63.7% 63.6%

Indiana

15.7% 15.7% 16.2% 18.7% 22.1% 25.4% 28.0% 31.5% 34.6% 38.3% 43.0% 49.1% 52.3% 56.7% 60.0% 64.3% 64.8%

Iowa

25.6% 25.2% 25.5% 26.8% 29.5% 32.8% 35.5% 38.5% 41.6% 44.4% 47.9% 54.5% 58.3% 63.2% 67.6% 68.6% 68.4%

Kansas

26.2% 25.7% 25.8% 27.3% 30.0% 33.5% 36.5% 39.2% 43.0% 45.7% 48.6% 55.0% 57.0% 60.6% 63.7% 65.5% 65.4%

Kentucky

21.0% 19.9% 18.9% 19.3% 21.0% 23.1% 25.3% 28.2% 30.9% 35.2% 42.9% 52.0% 56.9% 61.8% 65.0% 66.9% 68.4%

Louisiana

15.2% 15.2% 15.5% 17.8% 20.6% 23.2% 25.5% 28.0% 33.7% 37.8% 43.1% 49.1% 53.2% 58.2% 62.5% 63.7% 63.6%

Maine

17.5% 18.2% 20.0% 23.4% 28.1% 33.0% 36.4% 40.2% 44.8% 47.6% 50.3% 56.0% 60.5% 64.9% 68.7% 68.6% 68.4%

Maryland

24.4% 24.1% 24.2% 25.5% 28.0% 31.1% 33.9% 36.8% 40.3% 43.6% 46.8% 54.9% 57.5% 64.3% 68.9% 73.2% 74.8%

Massachusetts

26.3% 26.1% 26.2% 27.9% 30.9% 34.8% 38.7% 42.4% 46.9% 49.4% 52.1% 57.3% 61.7% 65.5% 68.7% 68.6% 68.4%

Michigan

26.9% 26.6% 27.0% 28.9% 32.5% 36.9% 40.8% 44.4% 48.8% 50.8% 52.9% 60.8% 64.5% 68.3% 69.1% 69.5% 70.0%

Minnesota

26.8% 26.6% 26.9% 29.5% 33.5% 38.2% 42.5% 46.1% 50.6% 52.4% 53.5% 58.5% 65.4% 71.9% 78.0% 81.1% 82.6%

Mississippi

14.1% 13.8% 14.2% 15.7% 17.4% 19.3% 21.1% 23.3% 25.4% 30.2% 39.9% 50.5% 58.2% 65.5% 68.7% 68.6% 68.4%

Missouri

23.0% 22.7% 23.1% 23.9% 26.0% 28.7% 30.7% 33.2% 35.7% 39.3% 47.3% 53.5% 56.8% 61.0% 62.5% 63.7% 63.6%

Montana

22.9% 22.0% 21.0% 22.8% 25.6% 28.8% 32.6% 36.4% 40.4% 43.1% 47.1% 52.4% 54.9% 58.3% 61.0% 63.7% 63.6%

Nebraska

25.5% 25.3% 25.5% 27.1% 29.8% 32.9% 35.5% 38.2% 41.3% 44.0% 48.5% 53.8% 56.3% 59.7% 62.5% 63.7% 63.6%

Nevada

16.3% 16.4% 16.8% 19.2% 22.3% 25.8% 28.9% 32.3% 35.9% 39.8% 44.6% 50.4% 53.4% 57.6% 60.6% 63.7% 63.6%

New Hampshire

16.3% 16.4% 16.9% 19.8% 24.2% 28.7% 32.5% 37.1% 41.9% 45.0% 49.0% 54.7% 56.9% 61.2% 64.2% 67.5% 69.9%

New Jersey

25.4% 25.1% 25.2% 26.7% 29.6% 33.3% 36.1% 39.4% 42.7% 43.2% 47.0% 53.9% 56.9% 59.9% 61.3% 64.0% 66.7%

New Mexico

15.8% 15.9% 16.3% 18.9% 22.4% 25.7% 28.5% 31.5% 34.6% 38.3% 47.5% 53.2% 56.6% 61.0% 62.5% 66.8% 70.0%

New York

27.1% 26.8% 27.0% 29.4% 33.2% 37.8% 41.7% 45.4% 49.8% 50.7% 52.2% 57.2% 58.0% 62.8% 65.9% 68.6% 68.4%

North Carolina

15.2% 15.1% 15.6% 17.6% 20.4% 23.5% 26.1% 29.2% 32.1% 36.3% 46.8% 52.7% 56.4% 61.6% 64.8% 67.5% 68.4%

North Dakota

16.7% 16.9% 17.3% 20.8% 25.3% 29.8% 33.8% 37.6% 41.6% 44.3% 48.2% 53.4% 55.5% 58.6% 61.2% 63.7% 63.6%

Ohio

24.6% 24.2% 24.2% 25.3% 27.6% 30.4% 32.8% 35.3% 38.3% 41.6% 45.2% 50.8% 55.5% 59.4% 62.5% 63.7% 63.6%

Oklahoma

15.8% 15.8% 16.3% 18.9% 22.5% 26.4% 29.7% 33.4% 37.0% 40.5% 46.6% 54.5% 57.2% 61.0% 62.5% 63.7% 64.3%

Oregon

24.5% 23.4% 22.1% 23.7% 26.7% 30.3% 34.4% 38.5% 42.7% 45.4% 50.5% 55.7% 57.5% 60.4% 62.5% 63.7% 63.6%

Pennsylvania

25.8% 25.5% 25.5% 27.1% 30.0% 33.5% 36.6% 39.2% 42.5% 45.3% 50.3% 56.0% 58.0% 61.0% 62.5% 63.7% 65.2%

Rhode Island

26.4% 26.1% 26.5% 28.9% 32.7% 37.2% 41.4% 44.6% 49.3% 51.3% 53.1% 58.1% 61.9% 65.5% 71.2% 74.0% 76.7%

South Carolina

14.9% 14.8% 15.1% 17.0% 19.8% 22.5% 24.8% 27.2% 32.9% 37.6% 43.3% 52.0% 56.0% 62.7% 65.9% 68.6% 68.4%

South Dakota

16.9% 17.0% 17.4% 20.3% 24.0% 27.7% 31.3% 34.4% 37.9% 41.2% 45.6% 51.6% 56.2% 59.7% 62.5% 63.7% 63.6%

Tennessee

14.9% 14.8% 15.0% 16.7% 18.9% 21.2% 23.3% 25.8% 31.6% 36.3% 44.9% 51.2% 55.7% 61.6% 63.7% 66.4% 67.3%

Texas

14.3% 14.0% 14.3% 16.1% 18.8% 21.4% 23.6% 26.5% 29.1% 33.7% 39.2% 48.9% 53.1% 58.2% 62.5% 65.2% 66.7%

Utah

23.7% 22.8% 21.7% 23.3% 26.0% 29.4% 33.2% 37.0% 40.8% 43.6% 47.6% 52.9% 56.6% 59.8% 62.5% 63.7% 63.6%

Vermont

27.2% 27.3% 27.8% 30.4% 34.6% 39.5% 43.8% 47.0% 51.2% 53.1% 54.2% 59.1% 64.7% 70.2% 75.6% 78.0% 78.8%

Virginia

15.9% 15.9% 16.5% 19.3% 23.0% 27.1% 30.6% 34.6% 38.3% 41.6% 46.0% 52.0% 56.2% 59.7% 62.5% 63.7% 63.6%

Washington

24.5% 23.6% 22.5% 24.7% 28.6% 33.1% 38.1% 42.6% 47.7% 49.6% 52.4% 57.3% 58.2% 61.9% 67.3% 72.4% 74.3%

West Virginia

23.6% 23.2% 23.0% 23.7% 25.3% 27.8% 29.9% 31.7% 36.6% 40.5% 46.9% 53.2% 58.2% 63.2% 65.3% 65.5% 65.4%

Wisconsin

27.2% 27.0% 27.5% 30.1% 34.5% 39.3% 43.5% 47.0% 51.2% 52.7% 54.6% 60.1% 62.1% 64.6% 66.6% 68.9% 70.6%

Wyoming

16.7% 16.8% 17.4% 20.4% 24.0% 27.9% 31.3% 34.8% 38.2% 41.4% 45.8% 51.4% 55.9% 59.6% 62.5% 63.7% 63.6%
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Appendix - Table C4
Estimated Percent of Early Childhood Years with Medicaid Eligibility
By Graduation Cohort - From Conception through Age 5
White Students
State

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

Alabama

6.5%

6.3%

6.2%

6.7%

7.3%

7.9%

8.4%

8.6%

9.0%

11.8% 14.5% 17.8% 22.3% 25.3% 28.0% 28.7% 28.4%

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

11.1% 14.9% 18.4% 21.4% 24.7% 27.6% 28.7% 29.5% 32.5% 32.9% 33.8% 34.7% 35.6% 35.2%

Alaska

8.3%

8.2%

8.3%

Arizona

0.0%

0.0%

1.0%

3.0%

5.1%

7.4%

9.5%

11.4% 14.1% 16.1% 19.7% 22.8% 24.7% 27.0% 28.2% 29.2% 29.1%

Arkansas

6.5%

6.3%

6.1%

6.8%

7.6%

8.4%

9.1%

9.9%

California

14.3% 14.1% 13.5% 14.8% 17.1% 19.0% 20.9% 22.4% 24.2% 24.9% 25.1% 27.3% 27.6% 29.7% 31.9% 33.8% 33.4%

12.1% 14.5% 19.4% 22.6% 25.1% 27.0% 28.0% 28.7% 28.4%

Colorado

12.3% 11.9% 11.3% 11.9% 13.1% 14.0% 14.8% 15.3% 16.0% 17.6% 19.2% 21.7% 23.4% 25.3% 27.2% 28.7% 28.4%

Connecticut

13.9% 13.5% 13.0% 14.3% 16.3% 18.2% 19.7% 21.6% 23.2% 23.9% 24.3% 26.2% 28.9% 31.3% 35.7% 36.9% 38.0%

Delaware

12.0% 11.5% 10.7% 11.1% 11.9% 12.6% 13.2% 13.6% 14.3% 16.2% 20.2% 22.8% 24.8% 27.0% 28.9% 30.5% 31.7%

District of Columbia

12.5% 12.0% 11.2% 11.6% 12.7% 13.5% 14.3% 15.0% 15.9% 16.1% 20.5% 23.0% 24.7% 26.0% 28.8% 31.2% 33.4%

Florida

7.1%

6.9%

6.8%

7.8%

9.0%

10.0% 11.0% 11.9% 14.0% 16.1% 19.8% 22.5% 24.6% 27.4% 28.9% 30.3% 31.0%

Georgia

6.4%

6.3%

6.2%

7.1%

8.2%

9.2%

Hawaii

15.2% 14.7% 13.8% 14.6% 16.0% 17.1% 18.0% 18.9% 20.2% 21.7% 23.3% 26.2% 28.2% 32.3% 36.0% 38.7% 43.3%
8.0%

Idaho

8.2%

Illinois

12.2% 11.7% 11.0% 11.4% 12.3% 13.1% 13.7% 14.2% 14.7% 16.5% 18.7% 21.3% 24.0% 26.1% 28.0% 28.7% 28.4%
7.0%

7.7%
6.9%

8.8%

10.2% 11.1% 12.0% 14.1% 18.0% 21.1% 23.4% 25.8% 28.0% 28.7% 28.9%

8.0%

10.1% 11.2% 12.2% 13.1% 13.9% 15.7% 18.0% 20.6% 22.8% 25.0% 27.1% 28.7% 28.4%

Indiana

7.2%

Iowa

13.0% 12.5% 11.8% 12.3% 13.4% 14.3% 14.9% 15.5% 16.2% 17.8% 19.6% 22.9% 25.9% 29.4% 32.9% 33.8% 33.4%

9.2%

10.2% 11.2% 12.1% 13.0% 14.9% 17.3% 20.3% 22.3% 24.6% 26.7% 29.3% 29.5%

Kansas

13.6% 13.0% 12.1% 12.6% 13.7% 14.6% 15.4% 15.9% 16.9% 18.5% 20.0% 23.1% 24.5% 26.8% 28.9% 30.3% 30.0%

Kentucky

9.7%

8.8%

7.8%

8.0%

8.6%

9.1%

9.8%

Louisiana

6.9%

6.7%

6.5%

7.4%

8.4%

9.3%

10.0% 10.7% 12.8% 15.0% 17.7% 20.5% 22.9% 25.6% 28.0% 28.7% 28.4%

10.6% 11.3% 13.5% 17.5% 22.0% 25.1% 27.7% 30.5% 32.2% 33.4%

8.6%

9.0%

10.4% 12.5% 14.1% 15.2% 16.2% 17.7% 19.3% 20.7% 23.5% 27.6% 30.8% 34.1% 33.8% 33.4%

Maine

8.2%

Maryland

11.9% 11.5% 10.8% 11.4% 12.4% 13.3% 14.1% 14.7% 15.6% 17.4% 19.1% 23.2% 25.0% 30.0% 34.4% 38.4% 39.4%

Massachusetts

13.7% 13.2% 12.4% 13.0% 14.2% 15.4% 16.6% 17.7% 19.0% 20.5% 22.0% 24.4% 28.3% 31.3% 34.1% 33.8% 33.4%

Michigan

14.3% 13.8% 13.1% 13.8% 15.2% 16.6% 17.6% 18.7% 19.9% 21.1% 22.4% 27.3% 30.9% 33.9% 34.5% 34.7% 34.8%

Minnesota

14.2% 13.9% 13.1% 14.3% 16.2% 17.8% 19.2% 20.2% 21.4% 22.4% 22.8% 25.1% 32.8% 39.6% 46.7% 50.6% 52.7%

Mississippi

6.0%

5.9%

5.7%

6.3%

Missouri

10.6% 10.4%

9.9%

10.4% 11.1% 11.8% 12.3% 12.8% 13.2% 15.3% 19.6% 22.6% 24.7% 27.0% 28.0% 28.7% 28.4%

6.8%

7.3%

7.8%

8.3%

8.8%

11.4% 16.2% 21.2% 26.7% 31.3% 34.1% 33.8% 33.4%

9.3%

10.0% 11.2% 12.1% 13.4% 14.6% 15.8% 17.3% 19.3% 21.8% 23.4% 25.3% 27.2% 28.7% 28.4%

Montana

11.1% 10.3%

Nebraska

12.8% 12.5% 11.9% 12.5% 13.5% 14.3% 15.0% 15.5% 16.1% 17.7% 20.0% 22.5% 24.2% 26.1% 28.0% 28.7% 28.4%

Nevada

7.7%

7.5%

7.3%

8.2%

9.3%

New Hampshire

7.8%

7.6%

7.4%

8.7%

10.5% 12.0% 13.3% 15.0% 16.6% 18.2% 20.1% 22.9% 24.4% 27.3% 29.8% 32.5% 34.1%

New Jersey

12.9% 12.4% 11.6% 12.2% 13.4% 14.4% 15.2% 15.9% 16.8% 16.7% 18.6% 22.1% 24.2% 26.0% 27.0% 29.5% 31.6%
7.1%

7.0%

8.1%

9.3%

10.4% 11.4% 12.5% 13.5% 15.6% 18.1% 20.8% 22.8% 25.0% 27.0% 28.7% 28.4%

New Mexico

7.3%

New York

14.5% 14.0% 13.2% 14.2% 15.9% 17.3% 18.5% 19.6% 20.8% 20.9% 21.7% 24.0% 24.8% 28.6% 31.3% 33.8% 33.4%

10.4% 11.4% 12.2% 13.0% 15.0% 19.9% 22.6% 24.6% 27.0% 28.0% 32.0% 34.7%

North Carolina

6.8%

6.6%

6.5%

7.3%

8.3%

North Dakota

8.1%

7.9%

7.8%

9.2%

11.0% 12.6% 13.9% 15.0% 16.3% 17.8% 19.7% 22.1% 23.7% 25.5% 27.3% 28.7% 28.4%

Ohio

11.9% 11.5% 10.8% 11.2% 12.1% 12.8% 13.4% 13.9% 14.5% 16.5% 18.4% 21.0% 23.8% 26.0% 28.0% 28.7% 28.4%
7.2%

7.0%

8.2%

9.6%

9.2%

10.1% 11.0% 11.8% 14.0% 19.5% 22.3% 24.6% 27.4% 30.2% 32.6% 33.4%

10.9% 12.0% 13.0% 14.0% 15.8% 19.1% 23.1% 24.9% 27.0% 28.0% 28.7% 28.9%

Oklahoma

7.3%

Oregon

12.8% 11.7% 10.3% 10.8% 12.1% 13.0% 14.3% 15.7% 17.1% 18.6% 21.0% 23.4% 24.8% 26.6% 28.0% 28.7% 28.4%

Pennsylvania

13.4% 12.8% 11.9% 12.4% 13.6% 14.5% 15.4% 15.8% 16.6% 18.2% 20.8% 23.7% 25.1% 27.0% 28.0% 28.7% 29.9%

Rhode Island

13.7% 13.3% 12.6% 13.6% 15.3% 16.8% 18.1% 19.0% 20.4% 21.5% 22.6% 24.9% 28.4% 31.3% 37.7% 40.9% 43.8%

South Carolina

6.6%

6.4%

6.3%

7.0%

8.0%

South Dakota

8.3%

8.0%

7.8%

9.0%

10.4% 11.6% 12.8% 13.5% 14.6% 16.3% 18.5% 21.4% 24.2% 26.1% 28.0% 28.7% 28.4%

8.8%

9.6%

10.1% 12.3% 14.8% 17.8% 22.0% 24.4% 28.6% 31.4% 33.8% 33.4%

Tennessee

6.6%

6.4%

6.2%

6.8%

7.5%

8.3%

8.9%

9.5%

11.7% 14.2% 18.6% 21.6% 24.2% 27.4% 28.9% 31.4% 32.1%

Texas

6.1%

5.9%

5.8%

6.4%

7.3%

8.2%

9.0%

9.8%

10.4% 12.9% 15.7% 20.4% 22.9% 25.5% 28.0% 30.4% 31.6%

Utah

12.0% 11.0%

9.8%

10.4% 11.5% 12.4% 13.7% 14.9% 16.0% 17.5% 19.5% 22.0% 24.3% 26.2% 28.0% 28.7% 28.4%

Vermont

14.6% 14.2% 13.6% 14.8% 16.7% 18.5% 19.9% 20.7% 21.9% 22.8% 23.4% 25.5% 31.4% 36.8% 42.3% 44.8% 45.5%

Virginia

7.5%

Washington

12.9% 11.9% 10.6% 11.6% 13.3% 14.7% 16.4% 18.0% 19.6% 20.6% 21.9% 24.2% 25.0% 28.0% 33.1% 37.8% 39.2%

7.3%

7.2%

8.4%

9.9%

11.3% 12.5% 13.7% 14.8% 16.5% 18.7% 21.6% 24.1% 26.1% 28.0% 28.7% 28.4%

West Virginia

11.4% 10.9% 10.0% 10.2% 10.7% 11.4% 12.0% 12.0% 13.8% 16.0% 19.4% 22.5% 26.1% 28.9% 30.5% 30.3% 30.0%

Wisconsin

14.5% 14.0% 13.4% 14.6% 16.6% 18.3% 19.7% 20.7% 21.8% 22.5% 23.7% 26.6% 28.5% 30.1% 31.8% 33.5% 34.7%

Wyoming

8.1%

7.9%

7.8%

9.0%

10.4% 11.7% 12.8% 13.9% 14.8% 16.5% 18.8% 21.3% 24.1% 26.1% 28.0% 28.7% 28.4%
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